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Abstract
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic
matchingmarketswhere (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) match-
ing is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses
two conceptual issues. First, since not all agents are available to match at
the same time, one must establish which agents are allowed to form block-
ing pairs. Second, dynamic matching markets exhibit a form of externality
that is not present in static markets: an agent’s payoff from remaining un-
matched cannot be defined independently of what other contemporaneous
agents’ outcomes are. Dynamically stable matchings always exist. Dynamic
stability is a necessary condition to ensure timely participation in the econ-
omy by ensuring that agents do not strategically delay the time at which they
are available to match.
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1 Introduction
I formulate a notion of stability, denoted dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic
matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) match-
ing is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. Stability notions provide an
analyst with a set of predictions for the self-enforcing outcomes of decentralized
matching markets that depend only on the primitive payoff structure. While sta-
bility notions are extensively used in the study of static matching markets, they
have not been systematically studied for dynamic matchingmarkets, even though
the latter are ubiquitous and cover many important applications, such as labor
markets and child adoption.
Defining stability in a dynamic matching market brings forth two new chal-
lenges that arise when taking into account agents’ intertemporal incentives. First,
since not all agents are available to match at the same time, it is natural to ask
which pairs of agents can object to a proposed matching. Dynamic stability as-
sumes that only agents who are available to match at the same time can form a
blocking pair. Second, whether an agent finds their matching partner acceptable
depends on what their value of remaining unmatched is. In turn, this decision de-
pends on what matching the agent conjectureswould ensue upon their decision to
remain unmatched. Given a conjectured continuation matching, one could define
an agent’s acceptable partners to be those who are preferred to the continuation
matching. This, together with a specification of the set of blocking pairs, is enough
to determinewhether amatching is stable in the dynamic economy: it should have
no blocking pairs and agents should always be matched to acceptable partners.
The missing step is then to determine what matching the agent conjectures
would result following their decision to remain unmatched. The first difficulty
is that the set of agents available to match from tomorrow onward depends both
on the arrivals into the economy and on who remains unmatched from previ-
ous periods. In other words, today’s matching together with tomorrow’s arrivals
define the set of feasible continuation matchings. When contemplating remain-
ing unmatched, the agent then needs to conjecture both who else remains un-
matched today and tomorrow’s continuation matching. Thus, as in the litera-
ture on the core with externalities (see, for instance, Shapley and Shubik (1969);
Rosenthal (1971); Richter (1974); Sasaki and Toda (1996); Rostek and Yoder (2017);
Pycia and Yenmez (2017)), an agent’s payoff from remaining unmatched cannot
be defined independently of what other contemporaneous agents’ matching out-
comes are. This externality sets apart dynamic matching markets from their static
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counterparts.
Given a conjecture about who else remains unmatched today, not all continua-
tionmatchings are equally reasonable. Indeed, the agent should correctly anticipate
that the continuation matching should be itself self-enforcing. Thus, for a given
conjecture about today’s matching outcome, the agent rules out those continua-
tion matchings that are not self-enforcing. This is still not enough to pin down a
unique continuation matching and, thus, the value of remaining unmatched. For
a given conjecture about who else remains unmatched today, there can be many
self-enforcingmatchings. Moreover, there can bemany conjectures about who else
remains unmatched today. Thus, the last step in determining the value of remain-
ing unmatched is an assumption on how the agent selects amongst the reasonable
conjectures. Like Sasaki and Toda (1996), I assume the agent’s value of remain-
ing unmatched coincides with the agent’s payoff at the most pessimistic conjec-
ture. Unlike Sasaki and Toda (1996), the agent does not entertain all continuation
matchings but only those that are self-enforcing in the continuation economy.
Dynamic stability (Definition 5) builds on the elements described above. A
matching for the dynamic economy is dynamically stable if (i) there is no pair of
agents who are available to match at the same time who prefer to match together
and (ii) there is no agent who is matched to someone who is unacceptable. Con-
trary to static notions of stability, the set of acceptable partners today is defined
using the set of dynamically stable matchings from tomorrow onward. Dynami-
cally stable matchings always exist in any finite horizon economy (Theorem 1); I
discuss their properties in Section 5.
The study of dynamic matching markets opens up new questions of interest to
market design, two of which are analyzed in Section 6. First, in a dynamic market,
agents canmanipulate a matching outcome by delaying the time at which they are
available to match. Proposition 4 in Section 6.1 shows that dynamic stability is a
necessary condition for timely participation in the market: whenever a matching
fails to satisfy dynamic stability, then market participants have an incentive to
delay the time at which they are available to match. This echoes the result from
static matching markets that stability is a necessary condition for participation
(Roth (1984a)). Second, the time at which a matching is finalized and, therefore,
when an agent can object to a matching, also becomes part of the design. This is
particularly important for sequential assignment problems, and in particular, af-
termarkets in school choice (Pathak (2016)). Section 6.2 analyzes the implications
of the theory for this application and highlights the assumptions regarding the
timing of matching and blocking implicit in the definition of dynamic stability.
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Related literature The paper contributes mainly to three strands of the litera-
ture. The first strand is the literature on market design, which studies dynamic
matching markets such as those in this paper, but from the point of view of op-
timality instead of stability (U¨nver (2010), Leshno (2017), Akbarpour et al. (2017),
Anderson et al. (2015), Schummer (2015), Bloch and Cantala (2017),Ashlagi et al.
(2018), Arnosti and Shi (2018),Baccara et al. (2019),Thakral (2019)). The present
study of stability is important because stability is considered a key property for
the success of algorithms (Roth (1991)) and because it highlights the potential is-
sues in applying the static notions of stability to dynamic matching markets.
The second strand is the literature on matching with frictions, which studies dy-
namic matching markets such as those in this paper in a non-cooperative frame-
work (see Burdett and Coles (1997), Eeckhout (1999), and Adachi (2000) for non-
transferable utility, and Shimer and Smith (2000) for transferable utility). While
matchings in this literature are determined via an exogenously given matching
function, in the present paper, matchings are determined as part of the solution
concept. Like in this strand of the literature, an agent’s value of remaining un-
matched (their continuation value) is determined endogenously by the remaining
agents in the market and the future matching opportunities.
The third strand studies stability notions for markets where matching oppor-
tunities are fixed and pairings can be revised over time (e.g., Damiano and Lam
(2005); Kurino (2009); Kadam and Kotowski (2018); Liu (2018); Kotowski (2019)).
The contribution relative to this strand is to provide stability notions for markets
where matching opportunities arrive (stochastically) over time and matching is
irreversible. This paper shares with Liu (2018) and Kotowski (2019) the perfec-
tion requirement (see also, Doval (2015, 2018)) and with Kotowski (2019) the use
of pessimistic conjectures. Since in Kotowski (2019) matching opportunities are
fixed, the externality discussed in the introduction is absent in his model. For this
reason, our motivations for using the approach in Sasaki and Toda (1996) differ.
Organization The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
provides an informal overview of the solution concept through two examples.
Section 3 describes the model and Section 4 defines dynamic stability. Section 5
shows that dynamically stable matchings exist and discusses their properties.
Section 6 discusses two practical implications of dynamic stability. Section 6.1
shows that dynamic stability ensures timely participation in themarket. Section 6.2
contrasts dynamic stability to the solution concept in Doval (2015, 2018), dis-
cussing the implications for sequential assignment problems, in particular, after-
markets in school choice. All proofs are in the appendices.
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2 Preview
I now illustrate dynamic stability and the main issues at hand by means of a two-
period example. The reader interested in the model can skip to Section 3 and to
Section 4 for the solution concepts, with little loss of continuity.
The purpose of the example is three-fold. First, I illustrate how one can ex-
tend the stability notion for static matching markets to the dynamic economy; I
denote this solution concept, the core. Second, I illustrate the conceptual issues
presented in the introduction and how dynamic stability deals with these. Finally,
while in the example the core is a subset of the set of dynamically stable match-
ings, a slight modification of the example shows that this is not always the case.
Section 5 provides a further example where the core and dynamic stability make
non-overlapping predictions.
The economy lasts for two periods, t ∈ {1, 2}. There are two sides, A and B. The
agents on side A are Erdo˝s, Kuhn, and Gale; they arrive at t = 1. Agents on side
B are Re´nyi and Shapley, who arrive at t = 1, and Tucker and Nash, who arrive at
t = 2 (the names are chosen to help the reader remember a matching that is used
as a benchmark). Assume all agents are discounted utility maximizers. In what
follows, the objective is to find the set of self-enforcing matchings.
2.1 Reduction to a static market
Oneway to approach the problem is to ignore the dynamics and treat the model as
a static matching model where an agent on side A prefers to match with Shapley
over matching with Tucker (resp., Nash) only if in the original economy, the utility
of matching with Shapley in t = 1 is higher than the discounted utility of match-
ing with Tucker (resp., Nash) in t = 2. This is analogous to Debreu’s dated-goods
approach in general equilibrium: matching with Tucker is defined by Tucker’s
characteristics and the time at which he becomes available to match.1 Table 1 be-
low lists the agents’ preferences. If (Tucker, 1) (resp., (Nash, 1)) appears before
(Shapley, 0) in an agent’s ranking, then they prefer to wait 1 period to match with
Tucker (resp., Nash) over matching immediately with Shapley; that is, the 0s and
1This approach is also analogous to matching with contracts: the contract specifies the agent one
matches with and the time at which the matching occurs, which must be no earlier than the date
on which the agent becomes available. For an application, see Dimakopoulos and Heller (2019).
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1s are the exponents of the discount factor, and the list provides the ranking of the
discounted utilities. 2 For side B, the lists represent the ranking of the utilities.
A:
Erdo˝s : (Tucker, 1) (Re´nyi, 0) (Nash, 0)
Kuhn : (Tucker, 1) (Nash, 0) (Shapley, 0) (Nash, 1)
Gale: (Shapley, 0) (Tucker, 1)
B:
Re´nyi : Erdo˝s
Shapley : Kuhn Gale
Tucker: Gale Erdo˝s Kuhn
Nash: Kuhn Erdo˝s
Table 1: Preference lists
In a static economy, the core captures the set of self-enforcing outcomes. Recall
that a matching is in the core if there is no pair of agents who prefer each other
to the partners assigned by the matching and no agent who prefers the matching
in which they are single to the proposed matching. That is, the matching must be
pairwise stable and individually rational. There is a unique core matching in this
example, denoted by mC and represented in the left panel of Figure 1 below. In
what follows, a horizontal line separates matchings that occur in different periods.
mC =


Erdo˝s Re´nyi
Kuhn Shapley
Gale Tucker
∅ Nash

 mNC =


Erdo˝s Re´nyi
Gale Shapley
Kuhn Tucker
∅ Nash


Figure 1: Core matching (left) and non-core matching (right)
2.2 Back to the dynamic matching market
The matching mC in Figure 1 is obtained by assuming that all pairs of agents can
form a blocking pair and the set of acceptable matching partners corresponds to
the set of agents who are preferred to matching with oneself. Importantly, the set
2Alternatively, I could havewritten the preferences over the dated goods, i.e., over (Shapley, 1),
(Tucker, 2), etc. However, this would not contain all the information needed to evaluate thematch-
ings both from the perspective of t = 1 and of t = 2.
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of acceptable partners can be defined from the primitives. I now follow a different
approach and consider defining the set of blocking pairs and the set of acceptable
partners directly in the dynamic economy. The main lesson is that both matchings
in Figure 1 are consistent with dynamic stability.
Dynamic stability assumes that only agents who are available to match at the
same time may form blocking pairs. This precludes agents from engaging in a di-
rect agreement before both of them are present to carry it out. To see the difference
between this assumption and the one in the core, consider why the matchingmNC
in Figure 1 is not in the core, even though it has no blocks involving a pair that is
available to match at the same time. Note that Erdo˝s and Tucker prefer to match
with each other over mNC . Since the core allows all pairs to form a block, it is as
if Erdo˝s and Tucker can agree in advance to match with each other, even if Tucker
is not present to carry this plan out. However, since Erdo˝s matches in t = 1 un-
der mNC , he is not available to match when Tucker arrives; therefore, they are not
allowed to form a blocking pair. Thus, for Erdo˝s to match with Tucker, he must
prefer to wait for Tucker to arrive over matching with Re´nyi. The next step is then
to define an agent’s payoff from remaining unmatched; this, in turn, allows us to
determine whether Erdo˝s prefers to wait for Tucker when the matching is mNC .
Defining an agent’s payoff from remaining unmatched is not immediate: what
an agent can achieve by remaining single depends on the period the agent is sup-
posed to match under the proposed matching. To see this, consider the matching
mNC in Figure 1. In t = 2, Kuhn should be able to guarantee that his outcome is at
least as good as that of remaining single. This, together with the observation that
there should not be any pairwise blocks amongst agents who match in period 2,
implies that the period-2 matching must be in the core of the economy formed by
the remaining agents from t = 1 and the newly arriving agents in t = 2.
Consider now Erdo˝s, who is supposed to match in t = 1. Erdo˝s’ payoff from
remaining single in t = 1 depends on what matching he conjectures would un-
fold instead as a result of his decision to remain unmatched in t = 1. Since the
t = 1 matching together with the arrivals defines the set of feasible matchings
in t = 2, Erdo˝s needs to conjecture who else remains unmatched today and what
matching will result tomorrow. Thus, as in the literature of the core with externali-
ties (see, for instance, Shapley and Shubik (1969); Rosenthal (1971); Richter (1974);
Sasaki and Toda (1996)), one needs to specify everyone else’s outcomes in t = 1,
in order to determine what is available to Erdo˝s, when he decides to remain un-
matched.
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To determine Erdo˝s’ payoff from remaining unmatched, one can first identify
which continuation matchings Erdo˝s can exclude from consideration. Because the
remaining and newly arriving agents in t = 2 can (and will) object to any period-2
matching that is not in the (period-2) core, Erdo˝s should exclude from considera-
tion any matching that does not specify period-2 stable matchings. Furthermore,
knowing the preferences of other period-1 agents, Erdo˝s may also exclude match-
ings that are not individually rational or are pairwise blocked in t = 1. This may
not be enough, however, to pin down Erdo˝s’ value from remaining unmatched.
Indeed, Figure 2 illustrates two matchings that are consistent with (i) Erdo˝s re-
maining single in t = 1, (ii) the period-2 matching being a (period-2) core match-
ing for the remaining and newly arriving agents, and (iii) the period-1 matching
being individually rational and having no pairwise blocks amongst the agents
who match in t = 1:
m1E =


Kuhn Shapley
Erdo˝s Re´nyi
Gale Tucker
∅ Nash

 m2E =


Gale Shapley
Erdo˝s Tucker
Kuhn Nash
∅ Re´nyi


Figure 2: Two conjectures Erdo˝s may have about the matching that ensues when
he waits to be matched in period 2
Note how Erdo˝s’ matching outcome depends on the set of agents who match in
t = 1. In the example, for each set of agents in t = 2, there is a unique (period-
2) core matching. However, different conjectures about who matches in t = 1
correspond to different continuation matchings in t = 2, as illustrated in Figure 2.
The final step to determine Erdo˝s’ payoff from remaining unmatched is to for-
mulate an assumption about how Erdo˝s evaluates the non-excluded conjectures.
Dynamic stability assumes that Erdo˝s forms a pessimistic conjecture: Erdo˝s prefers
to remain single over matching with Re´nyi in t = 1 only if he prefers all of the
non-excluded matchings to matching with Re´nyi in t = 1.
There are two ways to justify this assumption. One way is to invoke the point of
view of an analyst, who is to make a prediction of which outcomes cannot occur
in this economy. The analyst would then be confident in excluding a matching if
she is certain that there is a successful block. However, without a theory of how
Erdo˝s forms beliefs over reasonable matchings, the analyst would fail to rule out
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matchings where such certainty does not exist.3 Another way is to acknowledge
the uncertainty faced by Erdo˝s, both in terms of the stochasticity of tomorrow’s
arrivals4 and the need to predict other period-1 agents’ outcomes. It is then natu-
ral to assume that Erdo˝s chooses to remain single in t = 1 only if he is certain that
this constitutes an improvement over matching with Re´nyi.
Having determined Erdo˝s’ value of remaining unmatched, one can return to
the question of whether Erdo˝s prefers to remain unmatched in t = 1 and wait
for Tucker to arrive over matching with Re´nyi in t = 1. Since m1E is a reasonable
conjecture for Erdo˝s, it follows that by waiting to be matched, he can guarantee,
at most, his payoff from matching with Re´nyi in t = 2. Therefore, Erdo˝s prefers to
match with Re´nyi in t = 1 rather than to wait for Tucker to arrive. It is useful to
note that under the conjectured matching m1E, in t = 2 Tucker matches with Gale,
whom he prefers to Erdo˝s. Thus, when Erdo˝s and Tucker cannot agree in advance
that they will match together in t = 2, there are instances in which Tucker is not
willing to match with Erdo˝s, once Erdo˝s waits for him to arrive.
The above discussion implies that the matching mNC satisfies the conditions of
dynamic stability (Definition 5). The core matching mC is also dynamically sta-
ble. Indeed, the matching m2E in Figure 2 is a valid conjecture for Kuhn when he
considers remaining single in t = 1. Since Kuhn prefers to match with Shapley in
t = 1 over matching with Nash in t = 2, he cannot object to the core matching by
waiting to be matched. In this example, the set of dynamically stable matchings
is a superset of the core. Hence, an outside observer may mistakenly rule out the
matching mNC in Figure 1 by using the core as a solution concept.
2.3 Not all core matchings are dynamically stable
I now modify the above example to illustrate one final point: not all core match-
ings are dynamically stable.5 The example is modified as follows. Kuhn and Gale
continue to arrive at t = 1, while Erdo˝s now arrives at t = 2. Arrivals on side B
3This is similar in spirit to the approaches of Ambrus (2006) and Liu et al. (2014).
4This has been assumed away in the example.
5Appendix E shows an economy where the two core matchings that correspond to the out-
comes of the deferred acceptance algorithm are not dynamically stable.
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are as before, except that now Re´nyi no longer arrives. Preferences are given by
Erdo˝s : Nash
Kuhn : (Tucker, 1) (Nash, 0) (Shapley, 0) (Nash, 1)
Gale: (Shapley, 0) (Tucker, 1)
Shapley: Kuhn Gale
Tucker: Gale Kuhn
Nash: Kuhn Erdo˝s
There are two matchings in the core of this economy, illustrated in Figure 3:
mL =

 Kuhn ShapleyGale Tucker
Erdo˝s Nash

 mR =

 Gale ShapleyKuhn Tucker
Erdo˝s Nash


Figure 3: Two core matchings; the one on the left is not dynamically stable
However, matching mL is not dynamically stable: Kuhn can guarantee to be
matched with Tucker by remaining unmatched in t = 1. To see this, note that Gale
needs to also match in t = 2 in order for Kuhn not to match with Tucker in t = 2.
Hence, Kuhn needs to conjecture that everyone matches in t = 2 when he waits
to be matched. However, the worst stable matching in that case matches him
with Tucker. Thus, Kuhn can improve on the core matching mL by waiting to be
matched. Since the core assumes that Kuhn’s value from remaining unmatched is
his payoff from remaining single, it fails to capture that in the dynamic economy
Shapley is not acceptable to Kuhn.
3 Model
The economy lasts for T < ∞ periods. There are two sides A and B. Agents on
side A are labeled a ∈ A , while agents on side B are labeled b ∈ B, where A ,B
are finite sets.
For any t ≥ 1, let E t denote the subset of (2A × 2B)t that satisfies the following
property. A tuple Et = (A1, B1, . . . , At, Bt) ∈ E
t only if Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ and Bi ∩ Bj =
∅, whenever i 6= j.6 An economy of length T is a distribution GT on E T. In what
6To economize on notation, I assume that no two agents with the same characteristic arrive
within or across periods. Doval (2019) extends all results to the case where multiple agents with
the same characteristics can arrive within a period and across periods.
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follows, I refer to an element Et of E t as a realization, to a tuple (A1, . . . , At) as a
side-A arrival, and to a tuple (B1, . . . , Bt) as a side-B arrival.
Given a realization Et = (A1, B1, . . . , At, Bt), let As(E
t) = ∪st′=1At′ denote the
implied arrivals on side A through period s ≤ t; similarly, let Bs(Et) = ∪st′=1Bt′
denote the implied arrivals on side B through period s ≤ t. Finally, if s ≤ t and
Et = (Es, Et−s), then I say that Es is a truncation of Et and that Et follows Es.
Fix an economy GT. Definitions 1 and 2 below define the set of feasible alloca-
tions for GT.
Definition 1. A period-t matching for realization Et is a mapping
mt : At(E
t) ∪ Bt(E
t) 7→ At(E
t) ∪ Bt(E
t)
such that
1. For all a ∈ At(Et), mt(a) ∈ {a} ∪ Bt(Et),
2. For all b ∈ Bt(Et), mt(b) ∈ At(Et) ∪ {b},
3. For all k ∈ At(Et) ∪ Bt(Et), mt(mt(k)) = k.
Definition 2. A matching m for GT is a map on ∪Tt=1E
t such that
1. For all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, for all Et ∈ E t, m(Et) is a period-t matching,
2. For all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, for all Et ∈ E t, for all a ∈ At(Et), if m(Et)(a) 6= a, then
m(Es)(a) = m(Et)(a) for all s ≥ t and Es that follow Et.
Part 2 of Definition 2 incorporates the idea that matchings in the economy are
irreversible. Let MT denote the set of matchings for an economy of length T.
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Finally, given a matching m ∈ MT and a realization E
t, letMT(m, E
t) denote the
subset ofMT that coincide with m at realizations Es that do not follow Et.
Fix amatchingm and a realization of the arrivals through period t, Et = (Et−1, (At, Bt)).
This determines the agents who are available to match at Et:
A(mt−1, Et) = {a ∈ At−1(E
t) : m(Et−1)(a) = a} ∪ At
B(mt−1, Et) = {b ∈ At−1(E
t) : m(Et−1)(b) = b} ∪ Bt.
7The particular economy of length T, i.e., the distribution GT on E
T , defines which arrival
sequences on the domain of m have positive probability.
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In the above definition, mt−1 is defined as (m(E1), . . . ,m(Et−1)) where for each
s ≤ t− 1, Es is a truncation of Et.
A matching m and a realization Et also define a continuation economy of length
T− t, where the distribution of arrivals GT−t(mt, Et) assigns probability
GT((At+1, Bt+1, . . . , AT, BT)|E
t)
to the length T − t arrival
(A(mt, (Et, At+1, Bt+1)),B(m
t , (Et, At+1, Bt+1)), . . . , AT, BT),
and 0 to all others.
I close the model by defining agents’ preferences. Each a ∈ A defines a discount
factor δa ∈ [0, 1) and a Bernoulli utility, u(a, ·) : B ∪ {a} 7→ R. Similarly, each b ∈
B defines a discount factor δb ∈ [0, 1) and a Bernoulli utility, v(·, b) : A ∪ {b} 7→
R. I assume that for all a ∈ A and all b ∈ B, u(a, a) = v(b, b) = 0.
Fix a matching m and a realization Et. Let a ∈ A(mt−1, Et). For each ET =
(Et, ·), let tm(a, ET) denote the smallest t ≤ s such that m(Es)(a) 6= a and Es is a
truncation of ET ; otherwise, let tm(a, ET) = T. Then, let
U(a,m, Et) = EG(·|Et)[δ
tm(a,Et,·)−t
a u(a,m(E
t , ·)(a))],
denote a’s payoff from matching m at date t when the realization is Et. Similarly,
for b ∈ B(mt−1, Et), let
V(b,m, Et) = EG(·|Et)[δ
tm(b,Et,·)−t
b v(m(E
t, ·)(b), b)],
denote b’s payoff from matching m at date t when the realization is Et.
4 Stability and the core
Section 4 formally introduces the two solution concepts, dynamic stability and the
core. To define dynamic stability, I must introduce three concepts. Definition 3
extends the notion of pairwise stability from static markets to dynamic markets,
where only agents who are available to match at the same time can form blocking
pairs. Definition 4 introduces a minimal requirement that a matching must satisfy
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within a given period. I use this requirement to define recursively the set of con-
tinuation matchings an agent conjectures when the agent contemplates waiting
to be matched. With these three objects in hand, Definition 5 contains the formal
statement of dynamic stability.
In what follows, I denote a matching m as individually rational if for all real-
izations ET, for all a ∈ AT(ET), and all b ∈ BT(ET), u(a,m(ET)(a)) ≥ 0 and
v(m(ET)(b), b) ≥ 0.
Definition 3. Amatchingm is pairwise stable if there is no realization ET and pair
(a, b) ∈ AT(ET)× BT(ET) and t ≤ T such that
1. (a, b) ∈ A(mt−1, Et)×B(mt−1, Et),
2. u(a, b) > U(a,m, Et),
3. v(a, b) > V(b,m, Et).
When T = 1, Definition 3 is exactly the definition of pairwise stability for static
matching markets; hence, the name for the condition. Definition 3 states that there
should be no pair, (a, b) such that (i) they are both available to match at the same
realization, and (ii) they prefer to match together rather than to match according
to the proposed matching, m. Condition (i) does not imply that the agents in the
pair (a, b) arrive in the same period. Instead, it reflects the notion that in a dy-
namic matching market, agents who arrive in different periods can make direct
agreements only if they are available to match in the same period.
While Definition 3 rules out the presence of blocking pairs for a given matching
m, Definition 4 rules out the presence of blocking pairs in a given period:
Definition 4. Fix a matching m, a period t ≤ T, and a realization Et.m(Et) is stable
amongst those who match at Et if the following holds:
1. For all a ∈ A(mt−1, Et), u(a,m(Et)(a)) ≥ 0,
2. For all b ∈ B(mt−1, Et), v(m(Et)(b), b) ≥ 0,
3. There is no pair (a, b) ∈ A(mt−1, Et) × B(mt−1, Et) such that m(Et)(a) 6=
a,m(Et)(b) 6= b, u(a, b) > u(a,m(Et)(a)), and v(a, b) > v(m(Et)(b), b).
There are two differences between Definitions 3 and 4. First, Definition 3 does
not require that the matching be individually rational. That is, a matching m can
satisfy Definition 3 but fail Definition 4 because at realization Et, a ∈ A(mt−1, Et)
is matched to some b ∈ B(mt−1, Et) such that u(a, b) < 0. Second, while Definition 4
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checks for the presence of blocking pairs within a period, Definition 3 also con-
trols for blocking pairs across periods. As an example of this, recall Figure 2. The
matching m2E satisfies Definition 4 for every period t ∈ {1, 2}. However, it is not
pairwise stable because Kuhn and Shapley, who are available to match in t = 1,
would prefer to match together in t = 1.
Dynamic stability is defined recursively: to determine ifm is dynamically stable
for GT, one needs to know which matchings are dynamically stable for the contin-
uation economies that are consistent with GT, GT−t(m
t, Et). As in the example in
Section 2, the dynamically stable continuation matchings define an agent’s conjec-
tures. The last piece of notation before Definition 5 accomplishes this recursion.
Given an economy of length t, Gt, let Dt(Gt) denote the dynamically stable
matchings for Gt. Fix an economy of length T, GT. Fix a matching m ∈ MT, a
realization Et, and an agent k ∈ A(mt−1, Et) ∪ B(mt−1, Et). Suppose one is given
the correspondencesD1, . . . ,DT−t. This is enough to define the set of continuation
matchings that k conjectures may ensue if k decides to match later than period t.
The set of matchings that k conjectures at Et, denoted byMD(k,m, E
t), is defined
as follows. Since one cannot alter thematchings through period t− 1,MD(k,m, E
t)
is a subset ofMT(m, Et). Moreover, it satisfies the following properties: (i) k is un-
matched at Et, (ii) the continuation matching is dynamically stable for the continu-
ation economy GT−t(m
t, Et), and (iii) m(Et) is stable amongst those who match at
Et. Condition (ii) implies that k conjectures that the continuation economy abides
by the same rules when determining which outcomes are self-enforcing. Condi-
tion (iii) implies that k rules out that the agents who match at Et, when k remains
unmatched, would agree on a matching that they could have improved upon.
Formally,
MD(k,m, E
t) =


m ∈ MT(m, Et) : (i) m(Et)(k) = k
(ii) (m(Et+s))s∈{1,...,T−t} ∈ DT−t(GT−t(m
t, Et))
(iii) m(Et) satisfies Definition 4

 .
(1)
There is a slight abuse of notation in item (ii) of Equation 1. WhileDT−t(GT−t(m
t, Et))
defines a matching only for the agents that are unmatched from t+ 1 onward, m
also specifies the outcome for those who have matched through realization Et.
Item (ii) should then be read as “(m(Et+s))s∈{1,...,T−t} coincides with an element
of DT−t(·) for the agents who are yet to be matched at the end of period t.”
We are now ready to define dynamic stability:
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Definition 5. Let GT denote an economy of length T. Suppose one has defined the
correspondences (Dt)t≤T−1. A matching m is dynamically stable for GT if
1. m is pairwise stable,
2. For all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, all realizations Et on the support of GT, and all a ∈
A(mt−1, Et) such that m(Et)(a) 6= a, there exists m ∈ MD(a,m, E
t) such that
U(a,m, Et) ≥ U(a,m, Et).
3. For all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, all realizations Et on the support of GT, and all b ∈
B(mt−1, Et) such that m(Et)(b) 6= b, there exists m ∈ MD(b,m, E
t) such that
V(b,m, Et) ≥ V(b,m, Et).
LetDT(GT) denote the matchings inMT that are dynamically stable for GT.
I now unpack the definition of dynamic stability by considering different val-
ues of T. Consider first T = 1 and fix a matching m for the one-period economy.
Condition 1 in Definition 5 states that for all realizations E1, the matching m(E1)
has no pairwise blocks. Fix a realization E1 = (A1, B1) and consider now Condi-
tion 2 for a ∈ A1. Note that all matchings m in the set MD(a,m, E1) satisfy that
m1(a) = a (part (ii) in the definition of MD is vacuous). Thus, Condition 2 sim-
ply states that a prefers m to remaining single. Thus, when T = 1, Definition 5
reduces, for each realization E1, to the definition of stability for static economies.
It follows that the correspondence D1 maps one-period economies to the set of
ex-post stable matchings.
Suppose now that T > 1 and letm denote an element ofMT. Again, Condition 1
implies that m has no pairwise blocks amongst agents who are available to match
at the same realization. The discussion in the previous paragraph implies that
m(ET) is individually rational. Thus, m(ET) is in the core of the economy defined
by (A(mT−1, ET),B(mT−1, ET)).
Consider now the period T − 1 matching, m(ET−1). Conditions 2 and 3 imply
the following. Consider a ∈ A(mT−2, ET−1) who is supposed to match at ET−1.
If instead a remains single at ET−1, a anticipates that any continuation matching
m satisfies that m(ET) is a core matching for the remaining unmatched agents in
period T, i.e., m(ET−1, ·) ∈ D1(·). The elements of MD(a,m, E
T−1) differ in two
aspects. First, ifm,m′ ∈ MD(a,m, E
T−1)match the same set of agents at ET−1, then
they can differ in the core matching they select for the continuation economies in
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period T. Second, m,m′ may correspond to different configurations of agents who
match at ET−1, which in turn induces different configurations of agents who are
available to match in period T. Condition 2 states that a waits until period T
only if all such matchings are strictly preferred to matching at ET−1. Working
backward, a matching m is dynamically stable if there is no period t, realization
Et, and an agent who is supposed to match at Et such that the agent prefers all
matchings starting from Et that specify (i) dynamically stable continuations and
(ii) a matching that is stable for the agents who match at Et.
Note that when considering whether to match at Et or wait to be matched,
the agents use the correct distribution over continuation arrivals when calculat-
ing their payoffs. Thus, while Definition 5 has a flavor of pessimistic beliefs, this
pessimism only manifests through the matching the agent conjectures would en-
sue in the event that they remain unmatched.
While Definition 5 never explicitly requires that the matching be individually
rational, it follows from it that a dynamically stable matching is individually ra-
tional. As the previous discussion shows, if m is dynamically stable, then for all
ET, m(ET) is individually rational for the agents in A(mT−1, ET) ∪ B(mT−1, ET).
This, in turn, implies that all agents who match at a realization ET−1 according
to m must be matched to partners whom they prefer to remaining single. Oth-
erwise, Conditions 2 and 3 of Definition 5 would be violated: all matchings in
MD(k,m, E
T−1) involve individually rational period- Tmatchings. Working back-
ward through T− 2 to 1, it follows that m is individually rational.
The above observation formalizes the idea that in the dynamic economy the de-
cision to wait to be matched replaces the decision to remain single in the static
economy. That is, Conditions 2 and 3 extend the static notion of individual ratio-
nality to the dynamic economy. Moreover, it highlights that in a dynamic econ-
omy an agent’s “continuation value” is determined endogenously by what he can
achieve by remaining unmatched in one period and possibly matching in the fu-
ture.8
I conclude the section by introducing the definition of the core for the dynamic
economy. To simplify the exposition, I only do so for the case in which there is no
uncertainty over the arrivals, i.e., GT assigns probability 1 to one realization E
T.
Appendix C presents the statement for the case in which there is uncertainty over
the arrivals. When GT is not degenerate, the core has a many-to-many structure,
which complicates its definition. After all, when there is uncertainty over the ar-
8This resembles the logic in the literature of search and matching.
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rivals, one must take into account that, given a realization Et, an agent a ∈ At(Et)
may be matched with different side-B agents depending on the realization in pe-
riod t+ 1, as long as a does not match at Et. Thus, when comparing matchings, a
is comparing sets of matching partners.
Definition 6. Fix an economy, ET. A matching m is in the core if
1. For all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, for all a ∈ At, b ∈ Bt
U(a,m, Et) ≥ 0,V(b,m, Et) ≥ 0
2. There is no pair (a, b) ∈ AT × BT such that
δ
max{s−t,0}
a u(a, b) > U(a,m, E
t) and δ
max{t−s,0}
b v(a, b) > V(b,m, E
s),
whenever a ∈ At, b ∈ Bs. Let CT(E
T) denote the set of core matchings of ET .
There are two differences between the core and dynamic stability. First, in the
core, agents are free to form matchings with others, regardless of when they are
available to match, i.e., a and b can form a blocking coalition even if mt(a) 6=
a and b arrives at a period later than t (this is similar to Erdo˝s and Tucker in
Section 2). Implicit in this is that b can promise to match with awhen a waits for b
to arrive. Second, in the core, blocking coalitions compare the payoffs they obtain
by blocking with the payoffs from m. Whereas in dynamic stability, an agent a,
who blocks by waiting, compares his payoff from m with the payoffs he obtains
at the continuation matching originated by the block.
5 Properties
Theorem 1 presents the main existence result: the set of dynamically stable match-
ings is non-empty.
Theorem 1. For all T ∈ N, the correspondence DT is non-empty valued on {GT : GT ∈
∆(E T)}.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix A. The proof shows how to construct a
matching (labeledm⋆ in the proof) that is dynamically stable. The proof constructs
the matching forward from t = 1 to t = T. This is necessary because the set
of conjectures of an agent that matches in period t depends on the set of agents
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available to match from that period onwards, which, in turn, depends on how
agents have matched before period t.
To construct the matching, I adapt the proof technique in Sasaki and Toda (1996)
to the dynamic matching market. Consider the case in which T = 2. Fix a real-
ization E1. For each agent k ∈ A1 ∪ B1, I calculate k’s continuation value to be
the payoff from the worst matching in MD(k, ·, E1). When T = 2, the latter set is
non-empty because (i) the set of static stable matchings in period 2 is non-empty
regardless of the realization of the arrivals and (ii) the period-1 matching where
everyone is unmatched is stable amongst those whomatch in period 1. With these
continuation values at hand, I truncate k’s preferences so that k only deems accept-
able period-1 agents that are preferred to this continuation value. The matching
at E1, m
⋆(E1), is constructed by running deferred acceptance with agents in A1
proposing to agents in B1 with the truncated preferences. This, in turn, deter-
mines the set of unmatched agents at the end of period 1. For each E2, one then
chooses a stable matching amongst the newly arriving agents and the remaining
ones from period 1. The proof then checks that the matching constructed this way
is pairwise stable.
Despite the similarities with Sasaki and Toda (1996), there are also differences.
First, the set of available conjectures in a given period is endogenous to the match-
ing being constructed. Second, the elements in the set of conjectures must them-
selves satisfy the conditions of dynamic stability in the continuation. The latter
means that the proof must proceed by induction on T: to show that dynamic sta-
bility is well defined for T, one must show that it is well defined for T′ < T.
Sasaki and Toda (1996) show that a necessary condition for existence is that the
set of conjectures contains the set of all matchings. This, however, does not con-
tradict the result in Theorem 1. The reason is that while Sasaki and Toda (1996)
allow for general payoff externalities, the externalities present in the dynamic en-
vironment are different in nature. This is the reason why existence obtains in this
setting, despite the restrictions in the conjectures, while this restriction may be
problematic in their model.
While dynamically stable matchings are guaranteed to exist, as Proposition 1
below shows the core may be empty:
Proposition 1. When there is no uncertainty about arrivals, CT is non-empty valued on
{ET : ET ∈ E T}. Moreover, there exist economies GT such that CT(GT) = {∅}.
The first part of Proposition 1 follows from applying the algorithm inGale and Shapley
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(1962) to the “dated-goods” economy as in the example in Section 2. The second
part follows from the observation that when there is uncertainty over the arrivals,
the core has a many-to-many structure. In a companion working paper Doval
(2016), I show that the dynamic economy can be embedded in a many-to-many
matchingmodel so that the core in Definition 8 corresponds to the core of the static
many-to-many model. Moreover, when there is uncertainty over the arrivals, the
value of matching with an agent on side B at a particular realization depends on
who else is available to match at other realizations. This implies that the prefer-
ences in the correspondingmany-to-manymodel exhibit complementarities. Con-
sider the following example. In t = 1, B1 = {b1}, and, in t = 2, with probability p,
b2 arrives, and with the remaining probability, no one arrives on side B. Assume
u(a, b2) > u(a, b1) and pu(a, b2) + (1− p)u(a, b1) > u(a, b1) > pu(a, b2). Then, a’s
willingness to match with b2 depends on whether b1 is willing to wait to match in
t = 2. It is well-known in static many-to-(one)many matching that complemen-
tarities preclude existence (Kelso and Crawford (1982)); however, the observation
that these complementarities can be brought about by the stochasticity of the ar-
rivals is unique to the dynamic setting considered in this paper.
The examples in Section 2 suggest that when the core is non-empty, there is
always a core matching that is dynamically stable. However, as Proposition 2
records, this is an artifice of setting T = 2:
Proposition 2. Let T = 2 and GT be such that there is no uncertainty over the arrivals.
Then, C2(G2) ∩ D2(G2) 6= ∅. When T ≥ 3, there exist economies GT with no uncer-
tainty over the arrivals and such that CT(GT) ∩DT(GT) = ∅.
The proof of the first part of Proposition 2 is in Appendix C. An implication is
that, when the core is unique, then it is dynamically stable. One may be tempted
to infer from this that the matchings obtained by deferred acceptance are dynam-
ically stable. Example 3 in Appendix E shows, however, that this is not the case.
In the example, the matchings obtained by using deferred acceptance with either
side proposing are not dynamically stable; however, the median matching is dy-
namically stable.
To understand the second part of Proposition 2, consider the following version
of the example in Section 2:
Example 1. Let T = 3. Assume there is no uncertainty in the arrivals and they are
as follows. In t = 1, Erdo˝s, Re´nyi, and Shapley arrive. In t = 2, Kuhn and Gale
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arrive. Finally, in t = 3, Tucker and Nash arrive. Preferences are as follows:
Erdo˝s : (Tucker, 2) (Shapley, 0) (Re´nyi, 0)
Kuhn : (Tucker, 1) (Nash, 0) (Shapley, 0) (Nash, 1)
Gale: (Shapley, 0) (Tucker, 1)
Re´nyi : Erdo˝s
Shapley : (Kuhn, 1) (Gale, 0) (Erdo˝s, 0) (Gale, 1)
Tucker: Gale Erdo˝s Kuhn
Nash: Kuhn
It is easy to show that there is a unique core matching and that matching partners
are as in the matching mC in Figure 1: Erdo˝s matches with Re´nyi in t = 1, Kuhn
matches with Shapley in t = 2, and Gale matches with Tucker in t = 3.
This matching, however, is not dynamically stable. The reason is that when the
set of agents at the beginning of period 2 consists of {Kuhn, Gale, Shapley}, Kuhn
can guarantee that he matches with Tucker by remaining single in t = 2. Indeed,
the unique dynamically stable matching for that initial period 2 population has
Gale and Shapley match in t = 2 and Kuhn and Tucker match in t = 3.
The above implies that Shapley, by remaining unmatched in t = 1, can guaran-
tee, at most, the payoff of matching with Gale in t = 2. Thus, anticipating this,
he is willing to match with Erdo˝s in t = 1. Indeed, the following is a dynamically
stable matching:
mD =


Erdo˝s Shapley
∅
Kuhn Nash
Gale Tucker
∅ Re´nyi


The example highlights once again how feasible payoffs depend on the set of
agents available to match. Once Shapley matches in t = 1, Kuhn is no longer able
to match with Tucker. Kuhn and Shapley would both benefit from being able to
match together in t = 2. However, this is not credible: if Erdo˝s matches with Re´nyi
when Shapley waits for Kuhn to arrive, the only matching that is self-enforcing
matches Shapley with Gale.
It is interesting to understand the difference between T = 2 and T ≥ 3 driving
the result in Proposition 2, since it illustrates the role of one of the restrictions in
the set MD(·). Since the core is unique in Example 1, it seems one should be able
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to replicate the construction in Proposition 2 for the case T = 2 to show that it
is dynamically stable. The construction in that proof suggests that the following
matching prevents Kuhn from blocking the core matching:


∅
Gale Shapley
Kuhn Nash
Erdo˝s Tucker
∅ Re´nyi


Note that in this matching Erdo˝s matches in t = 3 and hence this matching
is not in MD(Kuhn,m
C , E2), where mC is the core matching. After all, the set
MD(Kuhn,m
C , E2) is constructed under the notion that bygones are bygones: once
one gets to t = 2, it is not possible to undo Erdo˝s’ match with Re´nyi. I believe this
is a natural restriction in a dynamic matching market. Notwithstanding this, it
is easy to see from the proof of the first part of Proposition 2 that, without this
restriction, there is always a core matching that satisfies a version of dynamic sta-
bility that does not involve this constraint. The issue is that if this core matching
is not truly dynamically stable, then once time starts running, the matching is not
self-enforcing unless one is allowed to undo past matchings.
One of the most useful properties of stability in static, two-sided, one-to-one
matching markets is the lattice property. Naturally, when there is no uncertainty
over the arrivals, the core inherits this property. As Example 5 in Appendix E
illustrates, dynamic stability does not have the lattice property.
6 Timing
The study of stability in dynamic matching markets opens up new questions
for market design, two of which are explored in this section. Section 6.1 shows
that dynamic stability is a necessary condition to ensure timely participation in
the market: the agents can “game” any individually rational and pairwise sta-
ble matching that is not dynamically stable by delaying the time at which they
make themselves available to match. This echoes the observation from static
matching markets that stability ensures participation in the market (Roth (1984a)).
Section 6.2 discusses the assumptions about the timing at which agents match and
form blocking coalitions implicit in dynamic stability. I connect this discussion to
the literature on sequential assignments and aftermarkets in school choice.
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6.1 Balking and reneging
The starting point of this section is the following simple observation. Suppose
T = 2 and there is no uncertainty about the arrivals, i.e., G2 assigns probability 1
to E2 = (A1, B1, A2, B2). Let m
A−DA denote the matching obtained by running the
deferred acceptance algorithm with agents in A1 ∪ A2 making proposals (using
their intertemporal preferences) to agents in B1 ∪ B2. The following holds:
Proposition 3. Let T = 2 and let G2 be as above. Then, for all a ∈ A1, there exists
m ∈ MD(a,m
A−DA, E1) such that
U(a,mA−DA, E1) ≥ U(a,m, E1).
Proposition 3 shows that, in a two-period economy with no uncertainty in the
arrivals, agents in A1 cannot improve on the outcome of side-A deferred accep-
tance by waiting to be matched. The most interesting part of this observation is
how it is proved (see Section B.2). I show that if an agent in A1 could improve
on deferred acceptance by waiting to be matched, then they would be able to ma-
nipulate the outcome of deferred acceptance by pretending to be an agent who
arrives in period 2. That is, they would be able to obtain an improvement by lying
about the time at which they are available to match. This observation motivates
the analysis in this section.
While in a static matching market agents can manipulate a matching outcome
by misrepresenting their preferences, a new form of manipulation is feasible in a
dynamic matching market: agents may misrepresent the time at which they be-
come available to match. There are two ways in which they can do so. First, they
could arrive in the economy and not make themselves available to match imme-
diately. Second, they could exit the economy before receiving a match (possibly
to rejoin the economy at a later point in time). These are similar to the ideas of
balking and reneging in queueing, so I use this terminology below.
Dynamic stability already embodies a notion of no reneging. After all, it stat-
ess that there is no realization Et and agent k who matches at Et, who would
instead benefit from remaining unmatched at Et, possibly matching at some later
period, whenever the continuation matching is itself a dynamically stable match-
ing. Proposition 4 below shows that dynamic stability also embodies no balking.
Indeed, it states that if a pairwise stable and individually rational matching fails
to satisfy dynamic stability for an agent who arrives in period t, then this agent
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may benefit from balking. These two observations together imply that dynamic
stability is a necessary condition to ensure timely participation in the market.
In what follows, I explain the assumptions needed to state Proposition 4. Fix an
economy of length T with stochastic arrivals, GT. Let m denote a matching for GT.
Consider the following game. In each period, agents on both sides arrive accord-
ing to GT. Upon arrival, each agent observes the remaining unmatched agents
from the previous period and the set of agents that have arrived within a period
(and their characteristics). Upon arrival, each agent chooses whether to reveal that
they have arrived. If they reveal this, however, their characteristics are immedi-
ately observed. Given a sequence of reported arrivals through period t, Eˆt, agents
are matched according to m(Eˆt).
The result requires that the distribution over E T satisfies an independence con-
dition. Say GT satisfies exchangeability if GT(E1, . . . , ET) = GT(E˜1, . . . , E˜T) when-
ever AT(E
T) = AT(E˜
T) and BT(E
T) = BT(E˜
T). That is, the probability of two
realizations ET and E˜T only depends on the arrivals they induce through period T
(and not on how they came to be.) Finally, say that a matching m for economy GT
is not dynamically stable for arriving agents if whenever there exists a realization
Et and an agent k ∈ A(mt−1, Et) ∪ B(mt−1, Et) who would benefit from waiting
to be matched, then there exists an agent k′ who would benefit from waiting to be
matched and arrived in period t. We are now ready to state Proposition 4:
Proposition 4. Suppose GT has full support and satisfies exchangeability. Let m ∈ MT
be pairwise stable and individually rational and suppose that m is not dynamically stable
for arriving agents. Then, there exists a period t, a realization Et = (Et−1, At, Bt), and
k ∈ At ∪ Bt such that
1. m(Et)(k) 6= k, and
2. k prefers m(Et \ {k}, ·) to m(Et). Formally, if k = a, then Et \ {a} = (Et−1, At \
{a}, Bt) and
u(a,m(Et)(a)) < EG(·|Et)[δ
tm(Et\{a},Et+1∪{a},·)
a u(a,mT(E
t \ {a}, Et+1 ∪ {a}, ·)(a))], (2)
and similarly if k = b, then Et \ {b} = (Et−1, At, Bt \ {b}) and
v(m(Et)(b), b) < EG(·|Et)[δ
tm(E
t\{b},Et+1∪{b},·)
b v(mT(E
t \ {b}, Et+1 ∪ {b}, ·)(b), b)]. (3)
To fix ideas, suppose k = a. Then, Equation 2 shows that a would improve
on his outcome by waiting until period t + 1 to report that they have arrived.9
9This does not imply, however, that delaying by one period is the best that a can do.
23
That is, when m is not dynamically stable, a has an incentive to balk, i.e., leave
without joining the economy. When everyone else reports their arrivals truthfully,
a induces in period t the matching m(Et \ {a}) by balking; next period, when a
joins the economy, the matching is then m(Et \ {a}, Et+1 ∪ {a}, ·) (note that a only
assigns positive probability to realizations Et+1 such that a /∈ Et+1.)
When T = 2, Proposition 4 follows straight from the definition of dynamic sta-
bility. When T ≥ 3, however, this is not the case. The issue is that m may fail
to be dynamically stable for arriving agents at Et, and yet a reveals his arrival
truthfully because m(Et \ {a}, ·) does not entail a continuation matching that is
dynamically stable.10 In this case, m(Et \ {a}, ·) could be worse than any reason-
able conjecture a may have under the assumption of dynamic stability. The key
is then to find the longest realization Et for which dynamic stability fails. This
ensures that m(Et \ {a}, ·) does pick continuation matchings that satisfy dynamic
stability for GT(·|Et \ {a}, Et+1 ∪ {a}) from period t+ 1 onward. The assumption
on GT ensures that these continuations are also dynamically stable when using
GT(·|E
t, Et+1).
The above discussion suggests that, when offering pairwise stable and individ-
ually rational matchings, there are two ways to incentivize timely participation
in the market: either the matching is dynamically stable or one is allowed to offer
(and enforce) non-credible continuation matchings. Otherwise, it is not possible to
prevent agents from either balking or reneging in the dynamic matching market.
6.2 When to match, when to form a block
In this section, I discuss an alternative definition of stability for dynamic match-
ing markets, which I denote passive dynamic stability.11 The purpose of this is
two-fold. First, by contrasting both stability notions, I can highlight the role the
assumptions about the timing at which matching, blocking, and arrivals occur
play in Theorem 1 and Proposition 4. As I explain below, these assumptions are
immaterial when T = 1, which highlights another novel feature of the dynamic
economy. Second, the timing assumptions implicit in passive dynamic stability
coincide with those of the algorithms used in sequential assignment and school
10Since m is pairwise stable and individually rational, m(Et \ {a}) is stable amongst those who
match in period t.
11Passive dynamic stability corresponds to the solution concept introduced in Doval (2015,
2018). The reason for the term “passive” will become clear with the definition.
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choice with aftermarkets (see Pathak (2016)). Since the date at which matchings
are finalized is part of the design, understanding the difference between the pre-
dictions of passive dynamic stability and dynamic stability is important for the
design of the algorithms used in sequential assignment and school choice.
The only difference between dynamic stability and passive dynamic stability is
the set of matchings that an agent conjectures would ensue when they decide to
remain unmatched in a given period. Let Pt(Gt) denote the set of passive dy-
namically stable matchings for Gt. Fix a matching m, a period t and an agent
k ∈ A(mt−1, Et) ∪ B(mt−1, Et). The set MP (k,m, E
t) is defined as follows:
MP(k,m, E
t) =


m ∈ MT(m, Et) : (i) mt(k) = k
(ii) (m(Et+s))s∈{1,...,T−t} ∈ PT−t(GT−t(m
t, Et))
(iii) m(Et)(k′) = m(Et)(k′) if k′ /∈ {k,m(Et)(k)}

 ,
(4)
Definition 7. Amatchingm for GT is passive dynamically stable if it satisfies the con-
ditions of Definition 5 substituting the correspondences (Ds)s≤T−1 for (Ps)s≤T−1.
To understand the difference between dynamic stability and passive dynamic
stability, contrast the sets defined in equations (1) and (4). These sets only differ
in condition (iii). While dynamic stability allows agent k to conjecture any period-
t matching consistent with individual rationality and pairwise stability amongst
the agents who match in period t, in passive dynamic stability agent k believes
that the agents in period t (except k’s matching partner) still match according to
m(Et). This is the reason for the prefix passive: agent k assumes that no one else
reacts to their decision to wait to match at some future period.12
As an illustration of this difference, consider the example in Section 2. When
consideringwhether Erdo˝s could block thematchingmNC in Figure 1, bothmatch-
ings in Figure 2 are possible conjectures for Erdo˝s under dynamic stability. How-
ever, only thematchingm2E in Figure 2 is a valid conjecture under passive dynamic
stability, since Gale’s assignment is the same as in mNC . Then, under passive dy-
namic stability, Erdo˝s blocks the matching mNC in Figure 1.
One way to interpret the difference between the two solution concepts is the
following. Dynamic stability presumes that in each period t, the timing of the
decisions in the economy is as follows:
12This is related to, but different from, the discussion of what a coalition can enforce, which is
relevant for defining farsighted stability; see, for instance, Mauleon et al. (2011) and Ray and Vohra
(2015). Inmymodel, when kwaits to bematched, he does not force others to change their matching;
however, he understands that his decision to wait may trigger others to change how they match.
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t.1 The unmatched agents through period t− 1 and the newly arriving agents at t
propose a period-t matching.
t.2 Assuming that other period-t agents have no objections to the matching, each
agent who is supposed to exit that period checks whether they would benefit
from staying or whether there is an agent with whom they could form a pair-
wise block.
t.2.1 If there are no objections, then agents match according to the period-t
matching and exit. The remaining unmatched agents are joined by the
new arrivals and we proceed to step (t+ 1).1.
t.2.2 If there are any objections, then return to step t.1.
In contrast, passive dynamic stability presumes that in each period t, the timing is
as follows:
t.1 The unmatched agents through period t− 1 and the newly arriving agents at t
match according to a period-t matching.
t.2 Assuming that other period-t agents have no objections to the matching, each
agent who is supposed to exit that period checks whether they would benefit
from staying or whether there is an agent with whom they could form a pair-
wise block.
t.3 Objections are carried out. The remaining agents are joined by the new entrants
and we proceed to step (t+ 1).1.
The set of stable matchings for economies of length 1 does not depend on the posi-
tion the analyst takes with respect to when matches and blocks are formed within
each period. Indeed, both timings described above are used to describe the static
notion of stability by different authors: Aumann (1961) and Roth and Sotomayor
(1992) use the first timing, while Gale and Shapley (1962) and Liu et al. (2014) use
the second one.13 This is a reflection of a deeper observation. For any economy
of length 1, it is easy to show that D1 = P1: they both coincide with the set of
pairwise stable and individually rational matchings at each realization E1.
However, the set of stable matchings in the dynamic economy does depend on
when matches and blocks are formed within a period. To understand the differ-
13However, when discussing what matchings a coalition can enforce, Roth and Sotomayor
(1992) adopt the perspective in passive dynamic stability: a coalition can only alter the match-
ing amongst its own members and (potentially) the matching of their previous matching partners,
who are now unmatched.
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ence between both timings, let T = 2 and letm denote a dynamically stable match-
ing. Thus, there would be no objections to this matching under the first timing.
Moreover, under the second timing, since m is pairwise stable, there would be
no objections involving pairs of agents who would rather match together. How-
ever, there could be an agent k who is supposed to match at some realization E1
and once everyone other than k is matched according to m(E1), k would benefit
from remaining unmatched at E1. Formally, since MP (k,m, E
1) ⊆ MD(k,m, E
1),
it could be that the conjecture m ∈ MD(k,m, E
1) that prevents k from blocking
under dynamic stability requires other agents in t = 1 to match differently than
m(E1). Thus, when k assumes that everyone else is matching according to m(E1),
k may improve on m by remaining unmatched. If m is not passive dynamically
stable, then there are gains to be made by blocking that are not exhausted when
the match forms in t = 1.
Theorem 2 formally summarizes the discussion above:14
Theorem 2. Let T ≥ 2. Then, the following hold:
1. For all economies of length T, PT(GT) ⊆ DT(GT), and there exist economies such
that the inclusion is strict (see Example 4).
2. There exist economies for which PT(GT) = {∅}.
The example in Section 2 is an instance in which P2(G2) = {∅}. To see this, note
that the two matchings in Figure 1 are the only two pairwise stable matchings (in
the sense of Definition 3). As explained above, under passive dynamic stability,
Erdo˝s can improve on his outcome under mNC by remaining unmatched in t =
1. The core matching mC is also not passive dynamically stable, since Kuhn can
improve on his outcome undermC by remaining unmatched in t = 1. When Erdo˝s
and Re´nyi match in t = 1, there is a unique stable matching in t = 2, where Kuhn
matches with Tucker.
That dynamic and passive dynamic stability may differ when T ≥ 2 is not sur-
prising given the analysis so far. The reason why the timing does not matter in the
14Du and Livne (2016) model the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) as a two-period
economy, where hospitals and residents arrive over time, preferences are supermodular, and in pe-
riod 2, an algorithm matches all unmatched agents according to a stable matching. They consider
a set of matchings satisfying weaker conditions than passive dynamic stability. They show that, as
the number of agents in the economy grows large, this set may be empty. While their paper neither
provides a stability notion for dynamic matching markets nor studies their properties, their result
suggests that the non-existence of dynamically stable matchings persists even in a large market.
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static model is that what a pair of agents or a single agent can achieve by them-
selves is independent of what others do, i.e., there are no externalities. However,
the dynamic matching market does feature an externality. What is available to an
agent who remains single in one period depends on the set of available agents
from tomorrow onward; this, in turn, depends on who matches today and who
remains to bematched. From this point of view, it is not a surprise that passive dy-
namic stability may be empty: it is well known that in markets with externalities
“passive” conjectures may allow too many blocking coalitions.
Aside from its role as a way to highlight the differences between the static and
the dynamic matching market, there are other reasons that passive dynamic sta-
bility is an important solution concept. An increasing number of papers deal with
the problem of sequential assignment.1516 The latter are problems where assign-
ments are performed in multiple stages because both market participants and
their matching opportunities become available over time. Between stages, par-
ticipants decide either to keep their assignment and exit or to stay for the next
round, in which case both they and their assignment are available to match in the
next round. Note the similarity with the timing implicit in passive dynamic stabil-
ity: market participants take as given others’ assignments when they make their
decisions to exit or stay.
As an example, consider aftermarkets in school choice (see Pathak (2016)). Pub-
lic school districts run their matching algorithms several times to accommodate
newly incoming students, newly available seats, and also the timing of decisions
of private and charter schools. While private and charter schools do not partic-
ipate of the centralized matching procedure, they are relevant matching oppor-
tunities for students who apply to both public and private /charter schools. In
15While sequential assignment is usually a many-to-one problem, the discussion that follows
focuses on the incentives of the one side. For instance, in the case of school choice, I focus on the
behavior of the students and regard the schools as non-strategic. Because my analysis is about a
one-to-one matching market, the analysis in this paper has nothing in principle to say about the
behavior of schools.
16See, for instance, Westkamp (2013); Dur and Kesten (2014); Feigenbaum et al. (2017);
Dogan and Yenmez (2018); Haeringer and Iehle´ (2019); Andersson et al. (2018); Mai and Vazirani
(2019). Except for the last two papers, this literature studies models that are in a sense static: the
agents and their matching opportunities are fixed. Even in a static model, running deferred accep-
tance sequentially may cause problems since deferred acceptance is not consistent. That is, if one
removes some agents and their assignments under deferred acceptance, mA−DA, and calculates
the matching obtained by deferred acceptance for the remaining agents and objects, one does not
obtains the restriction of mA−DA to the remaining set of agents and objects. This, in turn, may give
agents incentives to wait to be matched in a second round.
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between rounds, families must decide whether to take their assigned seat in pub-
lic school and exit, take their seat at the private/charter school (if they have been
admitted to one) and exit, or stay for the next round, in which case both they and
their assigned seat (if any) are available to match in the next round. Families may
decide to wait either because they may find out the result of their application to
private school or because new seats may become available at a more desirable
public school as a result, for instance, of other families exiting.
There are three reasons why the non-existence result for passive dynamic stabil-
ity is relevant for sequential assignment problems. First, it implies that running
at each stage a matching algorithm that produces stable matchings amongst the
agents whomatch in that periodmay not be enough to prevent agents from trying
to improve on their outcomes by waiting to be matched. Indeed, as described in
Andersson et al. (2018), some school districts run their algorithms multiple times,
even very close to the start of classes. This is a reflection that all such match-
ings can be improved upon by the agents under passive dynamic stability. Sec-
ond, it suggests that even if school choice algorithms are strategy-proof under
the assumptions that (i) the market is static and (ii) all schools participate of the
algorithm, this property may be compromised once we take into account that nei-
ther (i) and (ii) hold. As argued in Section 6.1, dynamic stability of the matching
implemented by the algorithm is a necessary condition for timely participation.
Even then, when passive dynamically stable matchings fail to exist, the agents
may give up on assignments that they declared acceptable.17 Finally, given that
dynamically stable matchings do exist, this suggests that an important aspect of
the design is to establish a date by which the matching is finalized and penalties
should someone modify the matching within the school district after this date.
Indeed, even the National Resident Matching Program has a clause that restricts
undoing and performing matches outside the algorithm once it has finalized.18
Given the above, the final result in the paper lists sufficient conditions under
which passive dynamically stable matchings exist. All the conditions are formally
defined in Appendix D:
Theorem 3. Suppose that either of the following hold:
1. Market participants are patient (Definition 9),
17Narita (2018) suggests that learning might be another reason for strategy-proofness to fail in a
dynamic matching market.
18See https://www.nrmp.org/match-participation-agreements/
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2. There are no cycles in preferences (Definition 10),
3. Agents on side B are not allowed to block by waiting and there is no uncertainty in
arrivals and {v(·, b)}b∈B satisfies Ergin-acyclicity,
then PT(·) 6= ∅.
The proof is in Appendix D. When the conditions in Theorem 3 hold, one does
not need to worry about which is the correct timing at which blocks and matches
are formed. Moreover, since passive dynamically stable matchings are also dy-
namically stable, they inherit the property of ensuring timely participation in the
market.
It is worth noting that, albeit for different reasons (see footnote 16), Ergin-acyclicity
has been identified to be an important property in the literature on sequential as-
signments. Theorem 3 provides yet another reason: when considering side B as
objects to be assigned in a dynamic matching market, Ergin-acyclicity guarantees
that there is a matching the agents on side A cannot improve on by waiting to be
matched. As the example in Doval (2019) shows, Ergin-acyclicity is not enough
when there is uncertainty over the arrivals. Note that this does not contradict the
existing results in the literature since in most models all objects arrive in period 1.
7 Conclusions
I formulate a notion of stability, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching
markets where matching opportunities arrive over time and matching is one-to-
one and irreversible. I also compare dynamic stability to other definitions, like the
core and passive dynamic stability. The comparison highlights the assumptions
about which agreements are feasible and the timing at which they occur, implicit
in each definition.
Several avenues are worth exploring and are left for future work. First, dy-
namic stability assumes that only pairs of agents or a single agent can block a
matching. This assumption is irrelevant in static, two-sided, one-to-one match-
ing markets. Extending dynamic stability to allow groups of agents blocking to
wait to be matched requires making assumptions on what conjectures the group
should hold (and whether their members should hold a common conjecture).
Second, while the proof of existence is constructive, the paper does not address
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how dynamically stable matchings may arise. Contrast this to Gale and Shapley
(1962), where the stability notion and the algorithm that implements them are
defined. Developing an algorithm that implements dynamically stable matchings
is definitely of interest. Additionally, providing a non-cooperative foundation for
dynamically stable matchings is worth exploring.
Third, while dynamic stability (and passive dynamic stability) are necessary for
timely participation in the market, the question remains as to whether the joint
manipulation of preferences and arrival times can be avoided. One reason this
may be important is to understand the data coming out of school choice algo-
rithms that have aftermarkets: even if the centralized algorithm is strategy-proof,
this property may be lost once we take into account the interaction with the after-
market.
Finally, it is common to use stability as an identifying assumption for empirical
work. The framework developed in this paper has the potential to allow empiri-
cal researchers to carry out similar exercises in dynamic matching markets. There
are a few papers that incorporate the dynamics of matching within their empir-
ical frameworks (see, for instance, Choo (2015); Narita (2018); Grenet et al. (2019)).
Notwithstanding the caveats in the previous paragraph regarding strategy-proofness,
dynamic stability would be another way to approach preference identification in
these settings.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
The proof proceeds by induction on T ≥ 2. As argued in the main text D1 coin-
cides with the set of pairwise stable matchings for the static economy. Let P(T)
denote the following inductive statement:
P(T) : The correspondence DT is non-empty valued.
I first prove P(2) = 1. Let G2 denote an economy of length T = 2. For each
E1 = (A1, B1) on the support of G2, I construct a matching m
⋆(E1) as follows. For
each k ∈ A1 ∪ B1, let m
k
E1
denote the payoff minimizing matching m such that
1. m(E1)(k) = k,
2. For each E2 = (E1, A2, B2) in the support of G2, m(E
1, A2, B2) is stable for
〈A(m, E2),B(m, E2)〉,
3. m(E1) is stable amongst those who match at E1.
Note that the set of matchings m that satisfy these three requirements is finite and
it is non-empty since the set of stable matchings in period 2 is non-empty and
a matching that leaves everyone unmatched in period 1 is stable amongst those
who match E1. Also note that item 2 implies that any such matching m satisfies
the requirement that m(E1, ·) ∈ D1(G2(m
1, E1)).
For each a ∈ A1, consider the preference list on B1 defined as follows: b ∈ B1 is
acceptable to a only if u(a, b) ≥ U(a,ma
E1
, E1) and is not acceptable to a otherwise.
Moreover, if b, b′ ∈ B1 are acceptable to a, then they are ordered according to
u(a, ·) in a’s preference list.
Similarly, for b ∈ B1, consider the preference list on A1 defined as follows:
a ∈ A1 is acceptable to b only if v(a, b) ≥ V(b,m
b
E1
, E1) and is not acceptable
to b otherwise. Moreover, if a, a′ ∈ A1 are acceptable to b, then they are ordered
according to v(·, b) in b’s preference list.
Define m⋆(E1) so that it coincides with the outcome of running the deferred ac-
ceptance algorithmwith agents in A1 proposing to agents in B1 using the truncated
preference lists.(If there are ties, fix a tie-breaking procedure and run deferred ac-
ceptance.)
For each period-2 economy E2 = (E1, A2, B2), let m
⋆(E2) coincide with m⋆(E1)
for those agents who matched at E1 and have it coincide with the outcome of
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running deferred acceptance on A(m⋆
1
, E1),B(m⋆
1
, E2), elsewhere.19
Note that m⋆ defined in this way is an element ofM2.
I note the following properties of m⋆. First, for all E2, m⋆(E2) is stable for
A(m⋆
1
, E1),B(m⋆
1
, E2). Second, for each E1, m⋆ satisfies the following: (i) there
is no pair (a, b) such that m⋆(E1)(a) 6= a,m⋆(E1)(b) 6= b that prefer matching with
each other than to match according to m⋆(E1), i.e., m⋆(E1) is stable amongst those
whomatch in period 1; (ii) there is no k ∈ A1 ∪ B1 such thatm
⋆(E1)(k) 6= k and for
all m ∈ MD(k,m
⋆, E1), k prefers m to m⋆. To see that (ii) holds, note the following.
By construction mk can always be taken to be an element of MD(k,m
⋆, E1) by hav-
ing it coincide with m⋆ at all realizations Et, t ∈ {1, 2} that do not (weakly) follow
E1. Moreover, if k is matched at E1, then it must be that k’s matching partner is
(weakly) preferred to mk.
Thus, to show that m⋆ ∈ D2(G2), it remains to be argued that it is pairwise
stable. To do so, it is only necessary to check that there is no realization E1 =
(A1, B1) and pair (a, b) ∈ A1 × B1 who prefer to match together at E
1 rather than
match according to m⋆. Toward a contradiction, suppose there is such a pair.
Since m⋆ is stable amongst those who match in period 1, it cannot be the case that
both a and b are matched at E1. Then, either a or b (or both) declared the other
unacceptable at E1 and is unmatched at E1. Without loss of generality, assume
that it is b, then
v(a, b) < V(b,mb
E1
, E1). (5)
Moreover, it must be that v(a, b) > V(b,m⋆, E1) since (a, b) form a pairwise block
of m⋆. It then follows that
V(b,m⋆, E1) < V(b,mbE1 , E
1). (6)
Note, however, that m⋆ satisfies the following: (i) m⋆(E1)(b) = b, (ii) (m⋆(E1, ·)) ∈
D1(G1(m
⋆
1
, E1)), and (iii) m⋆(E1) is stable amongst those who match in period
1. Then, m⋆ ∈ MD(b,m
⋆, E1). This, together with Equation 6, contradicts the
definition ofmb
E1
. By assuming instead that a is unmatched, a similar contradiction
follows. I conclude that m⋆ is pairwise stable.
This concludes the proof that P(2) = 1.
19Again, if there are indifferences, run deferred acceptance after having broken ties.
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I now prove the inductive step. Assume now that P(T′) = 1 for all T′ < T. I
show that P(T) = 1.
Given a realization ET = (A1, B1, . . . , AT, BT) in the support of GT, consider the
following procedure to construct m⋆(Et) for each truncation Et of ET. For each 1 ≤
t ≤ T − 1, having defined (m⋆(E1), . . . ,m⋆(Et−1)), let 〈A(m⋆
t−1
, Et),B(m⋆
t−1
, Et)〉
denote the agents available to match in period t (if t = 1, then A(∅, E1) =
A1,B(∅, E
1) = B1.) For each k ∈ A(m
⋆
t−1
, Et) ∪ B(m⋆
t−1
, Et), let mkEt denote the
matching m ∈ MT(m⋆
t−1
, Et) that minimizes k’s payoff20 at Et and satisfies that
1. m(Et)(k) = k
2. (m(Et+s))s∈{1,...,T−t} ∈ DT−t(GT−t(m
t, Et)).
3. m(Et) is stable amongst those who match in period t.
By the inductive hypothesis, Ds is non-empty valued for s < T. Since t ≥ 1, then
DT−t(·) is non-empty. Thus, for all k ∈ A(m⋆
t−1
, Et) ∪ B(m⋆
t−1
, Et), mkEt is well
defined since the above set of matchings is non-empty and finite.21
For each a ∈ A(m⋆
t−1
, Et), consider the preference list on B(m⋆
t−1
, Et) defined as
follows: b ∈ B(m⋆
t−1
, Et) is acceptable to a only if u(a, b) ≥ U(a,maEt , E
t) and is
not acceptable to a otherwise. Moreover, if b, b′ ∈ B(m⋆
t−1
, Et) are acceptable to a,
then they are ordered according to u(a, ·) in a’s preference list.
Similarly, for b ∈ B(m⋆
t−1
, Et), consider the preference list on A(m⋆
t−1
, Et) de-
fined as follows: a ∈ A(m⋆
t−1
, Et) is acceptable to b only if v(a, b) ≥ V(b,mbEt , E
t)
and is not acceptable to b otherwise. Moreover, if a, a′ ∈ A(m⋆
t−1
, Et) are accept-
able to b, then they are ordered according to v(·, b) in b’s preference list.
Definem⋆(Et) to be the outcome of deferred acceptance on 〈A(m⋆
t−1
, Et),B(m⋆
t−1
, Et)〉
using the above preference lists.
For t = T, let m⋆(ET) coincide with m⋆(ET−1) for all those who have matched
at ET−1 and with the outcome of running deferred acceptance with agents on
A(m⋆
T−1
, ET) proposing to agents on B(m⋆
T−1
, ET), elsewhere.
20That is, if k = a, I am minimizing U(a, ·, Et), while if k = b, I am minimizing V(b, ·, Et).
21Recall that the period-t matching that leaves all the agents in A(m⋆
t−1
, Et) ∪ B(m⋆
t−1
, Et) is
stable amongst those who match at Et.
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Note that this procedure on all Et and all 1 ≤ t ≤ T implies thatm⋆ is an element
ofMT. I now make some observations about m⋆.
First, for all periods t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, and all realizations Et, m⋆(Et) is stable
amongst those who match at Et. Second, for all periods t ∈ {1, . . . , T− 1}, and all
realizations Et, there is no k ∈ A(m⋆
t−1
, Et)∪B(m⋆
t−1
, Et) such that m⋆(Et)(k) 6= k
and for allm ∈ MD(k,m
⋆, Et), k prefersm tom⋆. To see that this holds note the fol-
lowing. By construction mkEt can always be taken to be an element ofMD(k,m
⋆, Et)
by having it coincide withm⋆ at all realizations Es that do not follow Et. Moreover,
if k is matched at Et, it must be that their matching partner is (weakly) preferred
to mkEt .
Fix t = T and note that for all ET, m⋆(ET) is pairwise stable and individually ra-
tional. Let t ≤ T − 1 and let Et denote a realization. Suppose that one has shown
that (m⋆(Et+s))s∈{1,...,T−t} is pairwise stable starting from period t + 1 onward.
Note that, in particular, this implies that (m⋆(Et+s))s∈{1,...,T−t} ∈ DT−t(GT−t(m
⋆
t
, Et)).
I now show that there are no pairwise blocks involving agents that have arrived
by Et. Toward a contradiction, suppose there exists a pair (a, b) ∈ A(m⋆
t−1
, Et)×
B(m⋆
t−1
, Et) such that
u(a, b) > U(a,m⋆, Et), v(a, b) > V(b,m⋆, Et).
Since m⋆(Et) is stable amongst those who match in period t, then it must be that
either a or b are unmatched at m⋆(Et). Without loss of generality, suppose that it
is b. Thus, b declared a as unacceptable in the truncated preference lists so that
v(a, b) < V(b,mbEt , E
t). (7)
Combining the above inequalities, it follows that
V(b,m⋆, Et) < V(b,mbEt , E
t). (8)
Note, however, that m⋆ ∈ MD(b,m
⋆, Et).22 This, together with Equation 8, con-
tradicts the definition of mbEt . Thus, m
⋆ is pairwise stable from period t onward.
Proceeding this way, it follows that m⋆ is pairwise stable. This proves P(T) = 1.
22This, of course, uses that we have shown that m⋆(Et, ·) is pairwise stable and has no blocks by
waiting.
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B Proofs of Section 6.1
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Let G2 and m
A−DA be as in the statement of Proposition 3. Let a ∈ A1(E
2) be
such that mA−DA(E1)(a) 6= a. Construct a matching m as follows. Run deferred
acceptance as if the economy was given by(A1 \ {a}, B1, A2 ∪ {a}, B2), that is:
(a) a makes proposals as if a arrived in t = 2 That is, a proposes to b ∈ B2(E2)
before b′ ∈ B2(E2) if, and only if, u(a, b) > u(a, , b′)
(b) b ∈ B1(E
2) accepts a’s offer over a′ ∈ A1 only if δbv(a, b) > v(a
′ , b).
Note thatm ∈ MD(a,m
A−DA, E1). Toward a contradiction, suppose thatU(a,m, E1) >
U(a,mA−DA, E1). Let A+ denote the set of agents on side A who prefer m to
mA−DA. According to a lemma by J.S. Hwang (see Gale and Sotomayor (1985) for
a proof), there exists a′ /∈ A+ and b ∈ m(E2)(A+) that block m as in Definition 6.
This is a contradiction since m is in the core of the economy (A1 \ {a}, B1, A2 ∪
{a}, B2). Thus, it cannot be that a strictly prefers m to mA−DA.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Let GT and m satisfy the assumptions of Proposition 4. Let t ≤ T − 1 denote the
largest s ≤ T− 1 such that there exists a realization Es such that either Conditions
2 or 3 of Definition 5 fail. Letting Et = (Et−1, At, Bt) denote the realization for
which either Conditions 2 or 3 of Definition 5 fail, it follows that there exists k ∈
A(mt−1, Et) ∪ B(mt−1, Et) such that m(Et)(k) 6= k that can improve by remaining
unmatched at Et. Moreover, since m is not dynamically stable for arriving agents
it follows that k ∈ At ∪ Bt. Without loss of generality, assume that k = a ∈ At.
In a slight abuse of notation, let Et \ {a} denote (Et−1, At \ {a}, Bt). Note that
A(mt−1, Et) \ {a} = A(mt−1, Et \ {a}) and B(mt−1, Et) = B(mt−1, Et \ {a})
I now define a matching, m, and argue that m ∈ MD(a,m
t−1, Et). First, let m ∈
MT(m
t−1, Et). Second, let
m(Et)(k′) =
{
m(Et \ {a})(k′) if k′ 6= a
a otherwise
40
Finally, for each 1 ≤ s ≤ T− t and realizations Et+s = (Et, Et+1, . . . , Et+s), let
m(Es)(k) = m(Et \ {a}, Et+1 ∪ {a}, . . . , Et+s)(k)
for each k ∈ A(mt+s−1, Et+s)∪B(mt+s−1, Et+s). Note thatm(Et) is stable amongst
those who match at Et by assumption. Moreover, a is unmatched at Et. It re-
mains to be argued that (m(Et+s))s∈{1,...,T−t} ∈ DT−t(GT−t(m, E
t)). Note that
by definition (m(Et \ {a}, Et+1 ∪ {a}, . . . , Et+s))s∈{1,...,T−t} satisfies the definition
of dynamic stability under distribution GT(·|Et \ {a}, Et+1 ∪ {a}, . . . , Et+s). Ex-
changeability implies that this is the same as GT(·|E
t, Et+1, . . . , Et+s)). Thus, m ∈
MD(a,m, E
t).
Sincem is not dynamically stable at Et, it follows that for allmatchings inMD(a,m, E
t),
U(a, ·, Et) > U(a,m, Et). In particular,
U(a,m, Et) > U(a,m, Et).
The result then follows.
C The core of a dynamic matching market
In this section, I extend the definition of the core to any economy GT. When GT
is not degenerate, the core has a many-to-many structure: an agent k may be
matched to different agents on the other side for different realizations Et. In partic-
ular, this implies that, given amatchingm, kmaywant to improve on k’s matching
outcome at certain realizations, while keeping their matching outcome the same
at some others. Definition 8 below allows these improvements as long as the rest
of the agents who match with k are not hurt by k’s block.
Let GT denote an economy. For each realization E
T on the support of GT and
each truncation Et = (A1, B1, . . . , At, Bt), a sequence CEt = (A
C
1 , B
C
1 , . . . , A
C
t , B
C
t ) is
a coalition at Et if for all s ≤ t, ACs ∪ B
C
s ⊆ As ∪ Bs.
Given an economy GT, the set C = {CEt : t ∈ {1, . . . , T},∑(Et+1,...,ET) GT(E
t, ·) >
0} is a feasible coalition for GT if, for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and all realizations E
t, if Es
follows Et, then CEs follows CEt .
A matching for a feasible coalition structure C is a mapping on C such that
1. m(CEt) : At(CEt) ∪ Bt(CEt) 7→ At(CEt) ∪ Bt(CEt) is a period-t matching, and
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2. For all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, for all realizations Et, for all a ∈ At(CEt), ifm(CEt)(a) 6=
a, then m(CEs)(a) = m(CEt)(a) for all t ≤ s and E
s that follow Et.
Finally, fix an economy GT and a feasible coalition structure, C . Let m denote
a matching for GT and m a feasible matching for C . Let CEt ∈ C be such that
CEt = (A
C
1 , B
C
1 , . . . , A
C
t , B
C
t ). For k ∈ A
C
t ∪ B
C
t , let
M(k,m,m) =
{m′ ∈ MT : (∀t ≤ s ≤ T)(∀E
s that follows Et)m′(Es)(k) ∈ {k,m(Es)(k),m(Es)(k)}},
denote the set of all matchings such that, for each realization Es that follows Et, k
is either single or matched to those agents to whom k is matched under m or m.
Definition 8. A matching m is in the core of economy GT if there is no feasible
coalition structure C and matching m feasible for coalition structure C such that
1. For all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, for all realizations Et on the support of GT, if CEt =
(AC1 , B
C
1 , . . . , A
C
t , B
C
t ), then
U(a,m, Et) ≥ U(a,m, Et) for all a ∈ ACt
V(b,m, Et) ≥ V(b,m, Et) for all b ∈ BCt
2. There exists t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and Et in the support of GT such that the above
inequalities are strict for some agent k ∈ ACt ∪ B
C
t ,
3. For all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, for all realizations Et on the support of GT, if CEt =
(AC1 , B
C
1 , . . . , A
C
t , B
C
t ), then
for all a ∈ ACt , U(a,m, E
t) ≥ U(a,m′, Et)for all m′ ∈ M(a,m,m)
for all b ∈ BCt , V(b,m, E
t) ≥ V(b,m, Et)for all m′ ∈ M(b,m,m)
When GT assigns probability 1 to one realization E
T , then Definition 8 coincides
with Definition 6. Condition 3 imposes a form of “dynamic consistency” on the
blocks: no blocking agent k can do better by being able to keep one of k’s former
matching partners underm by possibly dropping k’s newmatching partner under
m.23
As explained in the main body of the paper, the core may be empty when GT is
not degenerate. This is illustrated in the following example:
23Echenique and Oviedo (2006) call this the Blair core (see Blair (1988), and Roth (1984b)).
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Example 2. The example is based on the following economy. Arrivals are given
by:
A1 = {a1, a2, a3, a4},B1 = {b11, b12, b13}
B2 = {b21, b22} , B
′
2 = {b
′
21}.
G2 is such that G2(A1, B1,∅, B2) = p = 1− G2(A1, B1,∅, B
′
2). In what follows, let
E2 = (A1, B1,∅, B2) and E
′2 denote the other realization. Assume that agents on
side B do not discount the future and their preferences are given by
v(a4, b11) > 0 > max
a 6=a4
v(a, b11)
min
a 6=a4
v(a, b12) > 0 > v(a4, b12)
min{p, 1− p}v(a2 , b12) > max{p, 1− p}v(a1 , b12)
min{p, 1− p}v(a1 , b12) > max{p, 1− p}v(a3 , b12)
v(a3, b13), v(a2, b13) > 0 > v(a4, b13), v(a1, b13)
min{p, 1− p}v(a3 , b13) > max{p, 1− p}v(a2 , b13)
v(a1, b21) > v(a4, b21) > 0 > v(a2, b21), v(a3, b21)
v(a2, b22) > 0 > max
a 6=a2
v(a, b22)
v(a4, b
′
21) > v(a3, b
′
21) > 0 > max
a 6=a4,a3
v(a, b′21)
Preferences on side A are given by
u(a1 , b21) > u(a1, b12) > 0
u(a1 , b12) > δa1 [pu(a1 , b21) + (1− p)u(a1 , b12)]
u(a2 , b22) > u(a2, b13) > u(a2 , b12) > 0
u(a2 , b13) > δa2 [pu(a2 , b22) + (1− p)u(a2 , b13)]
> δa2 [pu(a2 , b22) + (1− p)u(a2 , b12)] > u(a2 , b12)
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u(a3, b12) > u(a3, b
′
21) > u(a3, b13) > 0
δa3 min{p, 1− p}u(a3 , b12) > δa3 max{p, 1− p}u(a3 , b
′
21) > u(a3, b13)
min{u(a4 , b21), u(a4 , b
′
21)} > u(a4, b11) > 0
δa4 [pu(a4 , b21) + (1− p)u(a4 , b
′
21)] > u(a4, b11) > δa4 [pu(a4 , b11) + (1− p)u(a4 , b
′
21)]
I now show that there is no matching in the core. The proof is by contradiction.
Assume there is such a matching, denote it by m.
Step 1: If m is in the core, then a3 has to be matched.
Otherwise, a3 and b13 block.
Step 2: There is no matching in the core such that a3 matches with b13 at t = 1.
Suppose there is. Then, a4 has to be matched -note that a4 can always match
with b11-, and so does a2 -a2 can always match with b12-. Suppose first that a2
matches in t = 1 with b12. Then, a1 matches with b21 in t = 2 when he be-
comes available, and hence, a4 matches with b11 - a4 only waits for b
′
21 if a4 can
get b21-. However, this is blocked by a3 matching with b
′
21. Suppose, then, that
m(E1)(a2) = a2,m(E
2)(a2) = b22,m(E
′2)(a2) = b12. The same steps as before lead
to a matching m that is blocked by a3 and b12 matching at E
2.
Step 3: There is no m in the core in which a3 matches with b12 at t = 1.
This is blocked by (a1, b12).
Step 4: There is nom in the core such thatm(E1)(a3) = a3,m(E
2)(a3) = b13,m(E
′2)(a3) =
b′21.
Note that a2 is always matched; a2 can always block with b12. However, if a2
matcheswith b12 at t = 1, this can be blocked by coalition CE2 = ({a2, a3}∅,∅, {b22}),CE′2 =
({a2, a3},∅,∅, {b′21}) andmatchingm(a3) = m(a3),m(E
2)(a2) = b22,m(E
′2)(a2) =
b13. Hence, suppose that a2 matches with b22 at E
2, and with b13 at E
′2 . Now, it has
to be that a1 matches with b12 -a1 has to be matched because otherwise a1 blocks
with b21, and this match is blocked by (a1, b12). Then, a4 blocks by matching with
b21 at E
2, and b′21 at E
′2 .
Step 5: There is no m in the core such that m(E2)(a3) = b12,m(E
′2)(a3) = b
′
21.
Then, a2 has to be matched with b13 at t = 1. Hence, a1 blocks with b12.
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Step 6: There is no m in the core such that m(E2)(a3) = b12,m(E
′2)(a3) = b13.
As before, it has to be that a2, a4 are matched. Note that the only possibility
for a2 is to match with b22 at E
2 and with b12 at E
′2 . Thus, a1 matches with
b21 at E
2, and a4 with b11. However, CE2 = ({a2, a3}, {b12},∅, {b22}), CE′2 =
({a2, a3}, {b12},∅, {b
′
21}) andm such thatm(E
2)(a2) = b22,m(E
′2)(a2) = b12,m(E
2)(a3) =
b12,m(E
′2)(a3) = b
′
21 is a block of m.
Step 7: There is no m in the core such that m(E2)(a3) = b13,m(E
′2)(a3) = b12.
In this case, a2 has to match with b22 at E
2, and with b13 at E
′2 . This is blocked by
(a1, b12).
C.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Assume in what follows that preferences over matchings are strict. For each b
in B1, let mb denote the matching m ∈ M2 that minimizes b’s payoff amongst
those that satisfy (i) m(E1)(b) = b, (ii) m(E2) ∈ D1(G1(m
1, E1)), and (iii) m(E1) is
stable amongst those who match at E1. Eliminate from b’s preferences all agents
a ∈ A2(E2) such that δ
1[b∈A2]
b v(a, b) < V(b,m
1, E1).
Let m⋆ denote the outcome of deferred acceptance with side A proposing and
agents on side B using the “truncated” preferences. I claim that m⋆ ∈ C2(E2) ∩
D2(E2).
Note first that for all b ∈ B1, Proposition 3 implies that V(b,m
B−DA, E1) ≥
V(b,mb, E
1), where mB−DA denotes the outcome of deferred acceptance with side
A proposing using the true preferences. Therefore, mB−DA is in the core of E2
under the “truncated” preferences as well. Therefore, if b ∈ B1 is matched un-
der mB−DA, it follows from Theorem 2.22 in Roth and Sotomayor (1992) that b is
matched under m⋆. Thus, m⋆ is in the core of E2 under the original preferences.
I claim now that m⋆ is dynamically stable. Clearly, m⋆ is pairwise stable. More-
over, by definition, for each b ∈ B1 such that m
⋆(E1)(b) 6= b, it follows that
V(b,m⋆, E1) ≥ V(b,mb, E
1), so that b cannot improve on m⋆ by remaining un-
matched in t = 1.
For a ∈ A1 such that m
⋆(E1)(a) 6= a, let M⋆D(a,m
⋆, E1) denote the set of match-
ings that a deems possible when remaining unmatched in t = 1 and preferences
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on side B are given by the “truncated” preferences. Proposition 3 implies that
there exists m⋆ ∈ M⋆D(a,m
⋆, E1) such thatU(a,m⋆, E1) ≥ U(a,m⋆, E1). I claim that
m⋆ ∈ MD(a,m
⋆, E1), so that m⋆ is dynamically stable.
Toward a contradiction, suppose that for all m ∈ MD(a,m
⋆, E1), one has that
U(a,m, E1) > U(a,m⋆, E1). It then follows that m⋆ /∈ MD(a,m
⋆, E1). Therefore,
it must be that there exists b ∈ B1 such that m
⋆(E2)(b) = b and under the true
preferences, b has a pairwise block in t = 2.24 Let Bˆ1 denote the set of all such b. Let
m˜(E2) denote a period 2 matching such that m˜(E2)(k) = m⋆(E1)(k) if k matches
in t = 1 under m⋆; otherwise, let m˜(E2) form an individually rational and stable
matching for 〈A(m⋆
1
, E2),B(m⋆
1
, E2)〉 under the original preferences. Note that it
cannot be the case that all b ∈ Bˆ1 are matched to someone they deemed acceptable
under the truncated preferences; otherwise, m˜ is also individually rational and
pairwise stable under the truncated preferences. The latter is a contradiction since
the set of agents who are single is the same across all stable matchings. Then, there
exists b ∈ Bˆ1 who is matched to someone they do not find acceptable under the
truncated preferences. Note then that since (m⋆(E1), m˜(E2)) ∈ MD(b,m
⋆, E1), it
follows that mb is not the payoff minimizing matching for b in that set. This is a
contradiction. It then follows that m⋆ ∈ MD(a,m
⋆, E1).
Thus, m⋆ ∈ D2(E2), completing the proof.
D Proofs of Section 6.2
I omit the proof of part 1 of Theorem 2 since it follows by applying the definitions.
Trivially, the inclusion holds when PT(GT) = ∅. When PT(GT) 6= ∅ and letting
m ∈ PT(GT), then for each realization E
t the set of conjectures MP (k,m, E
t) 6= ∅
for all k ∈ A(mt−1, Et) ∪ B(mt−1, Et). Applying the definitions backward from
the final period to the first it is possible to establish that the payoff minimizing
elements of MP (k,m, E
t) are in MD(k,m, E
t).
The rest of the section contains the omitted definitions and proofs for Section 6.2
for economies GT such that there is no uncertainty about the arrivals. Doval (2019)
includes the definitions and proofs for the case in which arrivals are uncertain.
24To see this, suppose that for all b ∈ B1, either m
⋆(E1)(b) 6= b or m⋆(E1) = b 6= m⋆(E2)(b).
Then, sincem⋆(E1) is stable amongst those whomatch in t = 1 andm⋆(E 2) is individually rational
and pairwise stable, it follows that m⋆ ∈ MD(a,m
⋆, E1).
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All definitions and results are stated for the case T = 2. It is immediate, though
tedious, to extend the conditions so that they apply for an economy of length
T ≥ 3.
Inwhat follows, let E2 = (A1, B1, A2, B2) denote the realization such thatG2(E
2) =
1.
Definition 9. Say that E2 is patient if
1. For all a ∈ A1, for all b1, b2 ∈ B2(E
2), whenever u(a, b2) > u(a, b1), then
δau(a, b2) > u(a, b1),
2. For all b ∈ B1, for all a1, a2 ∈ A2(E
2), whenever v(a2, b) > v(a1, b), then
δbv(a2, b) > v(a1, b).
For the next definition, for k ∈ A2(E2) ∪ B2(E2), let tk denote the date on which
agent k arrives.
Definition 10. A simultaneous preference cycle of length N + 1 is an alternating se-
quence a0, b0, . . . , aN , bN such that:
1. For all n ∈ {0, . . . ,N}, δ
tan−1
an u(an , bn+1) ≥ δanu(an, bn) ≥ 0,
2. For all n ∈ {0, . . . ,N}, δ
tbn−1
bn
v(an, bn) ≥ δanu(an−1, bn) ≥ 0,
where the indices are taken modulo N + 1.
E2 has no simultaneous preference cycles if for all N ≥ 1, there is no simultane-
ous preference cycle of length N + 1.
Definition 11. Suppose that for all b ∈ B, δb = 1. Say that v(·, b) satisfies Ergin-
acyclicity if there is no b, b′ ∈ B2(E2) and no a, a′ , a′′ ∈ A2(E2) such that
v(a, b) > v(a′ , b) > v(a′′ , b), and v(a′′ , b′) > v(a, b′).
I am now ready to prove Theorem 3:
Proof of part 1 Let m denote an element of C2(E2). Let a ∈ A1 be such that
m(E1)(a) 6= a. I claim that the matching m such that m(E2) = m(E2) and
m(E1)(k) =
{
m(E1)(k) if k /∈ {a,m(E1)(k)}
k otherwise
is an element of MP (a,m, E
1). To see this, note that m(E1) satisfies conditions
(i) and (iii) in the definition of MP (·). To see that m(E
2) is a stable matching
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amongst those who match in t = 2, note that if it is not, then there must be a
pairwise block involving either a or a’ s matching partner. Without loss of gen-
erality, suppose that the block involves a. Let b ∈ B(m1, E2) denote the agent
who blocks m(E2) with a. Then, u(a, b) > u(a,m(E1)(a)). If b ∈ B1, this con-
tradicts that m is a core matching. Then, b ∈ B2. Since E2 is patient, then
u(a, b) > u(a,m(E1)(a)) implies that δau(a, b) > u(a,m(E
1)(a)), also a contra-
diction to m being a core matching. Thus, m ∈ MP (a,m, E
1). Note that by con-
struction, U(a,m, E1) ≥ U(a,m, E1).
Since one can apply a similar construction to each b ∈ B1 as well, it follows that
m ∈ P2(E2).
Proof of part 2. Let m⋆ denote the unique matching in C2(E2). Fix a ∈ A1 such
thatm⋆(E1)(a) 6= a. Suppose there existsm ∈ MP (a,m
⋆, E1) such thatU(a,m, E1) >
U(a,m⋆, E1).
Let
A+ = {a′ ∈ A1 ∪ A2 : U(a
′ ,m, E1) > U(a′ ,m⋆, E1)}
B− = {b′ ∈ B1 ∪ B2 : V(b
′,m, E1) < V(b′,m⋆, E1)}.
Similar arguments to those in the Decomposition Lemma (Corollary 2.21 in Roth and Sotomayor
(1992)) imply that
m(E2)(A+) ⊆ B− and m⋆(E2)(B−) ⊆ A+.
It then follows thatm(E2)(A+) = m⋆(E2)(A+) = B−. Let G denote the following
directed graph. Nodes are A+ ∪ B−. There is an edge from a to b if b = m(E2)(a);
there is an edge from b to a if b = m⋆(E2)(a). Fix a′ ∈ A+ and follow the path
starting from a. I claim that the path cycles. Clearly, it cannot end at an unreached
a or b since, by definition, these agents are unmatched both at m⋆ and m. Thus,
the path cycles, and let (a0, b0, . . . , aN , bN) denote the cycle. The definitions of
A+ and B− imply that (a0, b0, . . . , aN , bN) form a simultaneous preference cycle,
a contradiction.
Thus, no such m exists. A similar argument shows that it cannot be that any
agent on side B can improve on m⋆ by remaining unmatched in t = 1. Thus, m⋆
is passive dynamically stable.
Proof of part 3. The proof follows from three steps. First, Proposition 5 below
states a property of cycles when priorities satisfy acyclicity. Second, let mA−DA
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denote the outcome of deferred acceptance with side A proposing. The proof of
the previous part implies that if there is an a in A1 who can improve onm
A−DA by
remaining unmatched in t = 1, then there must be a simultaneous preference cy-
cle. The first step determines the cycle’s length. Third, the workings of deferred
acceptance imply that the cycle is a violation of Ergin-acyclicity, a contradiction.
Definition 12. A sequence (a1, b1, ..., aN, bN), N ≥ 2 is an improvement cycle if for
all i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, v(ai , bi) > v(ai+1, bi) where the indices are taken modulo N.
Proposition 5. If {v(·, b) : b ∈ B} satisfies Ergin-acyclicity, and (a1, b1, ..., aN, bN) is
an improvement cycle, then N = 2.
Proof. Let (a1, b1, ..., aN, bN) be an improvement cycle, and suppose N > 2. Then,
for all i ∈ {1, ...,N − 1}v(ai , bi) > v(ai+1, bi), and v(aN , bN) > v(a1, bN).
I claim that Ergin-acyclicity implies (∀i)(∀j 6= i, i+ 1) v(aj, bi) > v(ai+1, bj). First,
note that Ergin-acyclicity implies that (∀i)v(ai−1, bi) > v(ai+1, bi), where i =
1 ⇒ i− 1 = N; otherwise, v(ai , bi) > v(ai+1, bi) > v(ai−1, bi) and v(ai−1, bi−1) >
v(ai , bi−1), a contradiction. Hence, v(ai , bi) > v(ai+1, bi), and v(ai−1, bi) > v(ai+1, bi).
Similarly, it must be the case that v(ai−2, bi) > v(ai+1, bi); otherwise v(ai−1, bi) >
v(ai+1, bi) > v(ai−2, bi) and v(ai−2, bi−2) > v(ai−1, bi−2) holds, violating Ergin-
acyclicity. Thus, v(ai , bi) > v(ai+1, bi), v(ai−1, bi) > v(ai+1, bi), and v(ai−2, bi) >
v(ai+1, bi), andwe can proceed inductively and complete this for all j /∈ {i, i+ 1}.
Now, take j /∈ {i, i + 1}. If v(aj, bi) > v(ai , bi) > v(ai+1, bi) and v(ai+1, bj−1) >
v(aj, bj−1) - note that j − 1 6= i-, then it has to be that v(ai , bi) > v(aj, bi) >
v(ai+1, bi) and v(ai+1, bi−1) > v(ai , bi−1), a contradiction.
25 Thus, N = 2.
Now let mA−DA denote the outcome of deferred acceptance with side A propos-
ing. Suppose there exists a in A1 such that m
A−DA(E1)(a) 6= a and there exists
m ∈ MP (a,m
A−DA, E1) such thatU(a,m, E1) > U(a,mA−DA, E1). It follows from
the proof of the previous part, that there exists a simultaneous preference cycle,
(b1, a1, . . . , bN, aN). By Proposition 5, it follows that N = 2. Hence, write the cy-
cle as (b1, a1, b2, a2). Moreover, it follows from the proof of the previous step that
b1 = m
A−DA(E2)(a1), b2 = m
A−DA(E2)(a2).
Let r be the last step of the deferred acceptance algorithm in which an agent in
{a1, a2}makes an offer (and, is accepted by) the agent to whom they are matched
under mA−DA. Without loss of generality, say that a1 proposes to b1 at step r.
25Here is where N > 2 matters most; worst-case scenario j = i− 1
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Let l ∈ {1, 2}. Since u(al ,m
A−DA(E2)(al+1)) > u(al ,m
A−DA(E2)(al)), al was re-
jected by mA−DA(E2)(al+1) before step r. Hence, at step r− 1, m
A−DA(E2)(al+1)
was matched to some agent, and at r− 1, b1 had an upstanding offer from some
agent and it is not a2; otherwise a2 is rejected in step r when a1 makes an of-
fer to b1. Hence, (∃aˆ /∈ {a1, a2})such that v(a1, b1) > v(aˆ, b1) > v(a2, b1). Since
v(a2, b2) > v(a1, b1), this contradicts Ergin-acyclicity. Therefore,m
A−DA ∈ P2(E2).
E Examples
Example 3. [An economy where the extremal matchings are not dynamically sta-
ble] Consider the following two-period economy with deterministic arrivals:
1. Arrivals are given by
A1 = {a1, a
′
1, a
′
2}, A2 = {a3, a2, a
′
3}
B1 = {b1, b
′
1, b2}, B2 = {b3, b
′
2, b
′
3}
2. Preferences are given by
a1 : (b1, 0) (b
′
1, 0) (b2, 0)
a′1 : (b
′
2, 1) (b
′
3, 0) (b
′
1, 0) (b
′
3, 1)
a′2 : (b
′
1, 0) (b2, 0) (b
′
2, 0)
a2 : (b2, 0) (b1, 0)
a′3 : (b
′
3, 0)
a3 : (b1, 0) (b3, 0)
b1 : (a2, 1) (a3, 0) (a1, 0) (a3, 1)
b′1 : (a
′
1, 0) (a1, 0) (a3, 0)
b2 : (a1, 0) (a
′
2, 0) (a2, 0)
b3 : (a3, 0)
b′2 : (a
′
2, 0) (a
′
1, 0)
b′3 : (a
′
1, 0) (a
′
3, 0)
The following two core matchings are the side-A optimal matching (left) and the
side-B optimal matching (right):26
mA−DA =


a1 b1
a′2 b
′
1
a′1 b
′
2
a2 b2
a′3 b
′
3
a3 b3


mB−DA =


a1 b2
a′1 b
′
1
a′2 b
′
2
a2 b1
a′3 b
′
3
a3 b3


26As usual, the horizontal line divides the matchings that happen in t = 1 and t = 2.
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I now show thatV(b1,m, E1) > V(b1,m
A−DA, E1) for allmatchingsm ∈ MD(b1,m
A−DA, E1).
Toward a contradiction, suppose there exists one suchmatchingm such thatV(b1,m
A−DA, E1) ≥
V(b1,m, E1). Then, it must be the case that b1 does not match with a2 under m. To
guarantee this, note that b2 must also match in t = 2. This implies that, at most,
one pair can be matched in t = 1. Below, for each such pair (including the possibil-
ity that no one matches in period 1), the period-2 matching is obtained by running
side-A proposing deferred acceptance on the remaining agents:


a1 b
′
1
a2 b1
a3 b3
a′2 b2
a′1 b
′
2
a′3 b
′
3




a′1 b
′
1
a2 b1
a3 b3
a1 b2
a′2 b
′
2
a′3 b
′
3




a′2 b
′
1
a2 b1
a3 b3
a1 b2
a′1 b
′
2
a′3 b2




∅
a2 b1
a3 b3
a1 b2
a′2 b
′
1
a′1 b
′
2
a′3 b
′
3


Note that in each case b1 ends up being matched with a2. Since this is her most
preferred matching, she blocks mA−DA by waiting.
Similarly, it is possible to show that a′1 blocks m
B−DA by waiting. In order for a′1
not to block mB−DA by waiting, it must be that he never matches with b′2 in t = 2.
Hence, a′2 must also match in t = 2. As before, this implies that, at most, one pair
can form in t = 1. Below, for each such pair (including the possibility that no one
matches in t = 1 ), the t = 2 -matching is obtained by running side-B proposing
deferred acceptance on the remaining agents:


a1 b1
a2 b2
a3 b3
a′1 b
′
2
a′3 b
′
3
a′2 b
′
1




a1 b2
a2 b1
a3 b3
a′1 b
′
2
a′3 b
′
3
a′2 b
′
1




a1 b
′
1
a2 b1
a3 b3
a′1 b
′
2
a′3 b
′
3
a′2 b2




∅
a1 b2
a2 b1
a3 b3
a′1 b
′
2
a′3 b
′
3
a′2 b
′
1


Note that in each case a′1 matches with b
′
2 who is a
′
1’s preferred match. Thus, a
′
1
blocks mB−DA by waiting.
Nevertheless, there is a non-extremal core matching that is dynamically stable
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and given by 

a1 b
′
1
a′2 b2
a2 b1
a3 b3
a′1 b
′
2
a′3 b
′
3


In this matching, note that b1 is matched to her partner under m
B−DA, a2, and a
′
1
is matched to his partner under mA−DA, b′2.
Example 4. [An economy where PT ( DT.] Consider the following economy:
1. Arrivals are given by
A1 = {a11, a12}, A2 = {a21}
B1 = {b11, b12, b13}, B2 = {b21}
2. Preferences are given by:
a11 : (b12, 0) (b13, 1) (b21, 1) (b11, 0) (b12, 1)
a12 : (b13, 0) (b13, 1) (b12, 0) (b12, 1)
a21 : (b11, 0) (b13, 0)
b11 : (a11, 0) (a21, 0)
b12 : (a12, 0) (a11, 0)
b13 : (a21, 1) (a12, 0) (a11, 0)
b21 : (a11, 0)
In this economy, there is a unique core matching (the horizontal line divides time
periods):
a11 b12
a12 b13
a21 b11
∅ b21
It is possible to check that it is passive-dynamically stable.
Now consider the following dynamically stable matching, m⋆:
a11 b11
a12 b12
a21 b13
∅ b21
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Clearly, it is not a core matching: (a11, b21) constitute a block. It is also not passive-
dynamically stable. To see why, note that a11 has a block by waiting. Indeed, there
is unique matching m ∈ MP (a11,m
⋆, E1). m is as follows:
a12 b12
a11 b13
a21 b11
∅ b21
Since a11 prefers to match with b13 in period 2 over matching with b11 in period 1,
m⋆ is not passive-dynamically stable.
To see why m⋆ is dynamically stable, note first that the following matching is in
MD(a11,m
⋆, E1): 

a12 b13
a11 b12
a21 b11
∅ b21


Since a11 prefers b11 in period 1 to matching with b12 only in period 2, a11 does not
block m⋆ by waiting. One can similarly show that a12 does not have a block by
waiting. Thus, m⋆ is dynamically stable.
Example 5 (Failure of lattice property). Consider the following economy. Arrivals
are as follows A1 = {a1, a2, a3}, B1 = {b1}, B2 = {b2, b3}. Preferences are as
follows:
a1 : (b2, 0) (b2, 1) (b1, 0) (b1, 1) (b3, 0) (b3, 1)
a2 : (b2, 0) (b2, 1) (b3, 0) (b1, 0) (b3, 1) (b1, 1)
a3 : (b3, 0) (b3, 1) (b2, 0) (b2, 1) (b1, 0) (b1, 1)
b1 : (a1, 0) (a2, 0) (a1, 1)
b2 : a3 a1 a2
b3 : a2 a3
The following matchings two matchings are dynamically stable:
mL =

 a2 b1a1 b2
a3 b3

 mR =

 a1 b1a2 b2
a3 b3


To see this, the following conjecture works for both matchings and for agents
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a1, a2, b1: 

∅
a1 b1
a2 b3
a3 b2


The lattice property fails because a2 prefers m
R to mL, and a1 prefers m
L to mR.
Note that only mL is in the core.
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